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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This dissertation addresses how agents in the urban informal sector use social capital to access 
scarce resources. Social capital denotes network-based social bonds that might facilitate access 
to a resource. An instrumental, agent-oriented view of social capital is applied in the analysis. 
This view embraces agents actively constructing and using social bonds with other agents in 
order to access scarce resources. 
 The subjects placed at the centre of the discussion are leaders of micro-enterprises. 
They operate in Obunga, an informal urban settlement situated on the Kenyan shores of Lake 
Victoria. These agents, called wuontich, specialise in frying the fish skeletons which remain 
after the processing of Nile perch by modern processing plants. The skeletons are sold to inland 
markets where they are highly valued as food for human consumption. To obtain skeletons for 
their micro-enterprises, the wuontich need personal contact with middlemen, called jawero, who 
have a monopoly on the distribution of skeletons from the processing plants to the informal fish-
processing field. I ask whether the wuontich instrumentally use their social bonds with the 
middlemen as social capital that might enhance their access to fish skeletons.  
 The discussion is based upon data from observations and in-depth interviews with 
informants operating in, and associated with, the skeleton industry. This material was collected 
during a four month long field study in Obunga. I claim that in this setting, characterised by 
poverty, an influx of migrants and a high HIV prevalence, the agents instrumentally construct 
and use social bonds as social capital to access skeletons. Social capital is shown to be a flexible 
resource that can be used by the agents under dramatic contextual changes. I emphasise, 
however, that social capital might not be a resource equally flexible to all. Female agents, and 
agents lacking economic means seem to have greater difficulties constructing and using social 
capital to access skeletons under dramatic contextual change. 
 I argue that the discussion of the instrumental construction and use of social capital 
generates three main findings not often mentioned in debates on social capital. The first finding 
indicates that inherent in this form of social capital is a flexibility that makes it a valuable 
resource to the individual agent. The second finding points out that instrumentally constructed 
social capital contains an instability that might hamper development at the community level. 
The third main finding indicates that this kind of social capital seems to require economic input 
 in order to ensure access to skeletons. Poor people might thus have difficulties realising the full 
potential of social capital as a resource in this setting.  
Although the Obunga case study represents one specific field, I argue that it generates 
important questions that should be asked when studying social capital in the urban informal 
sector. The study provides arguments in favour of recognising that social capital might be 
instrumentally constructed and used in similar settings. The Obunga study also underlines the 
necessity of recognising the specific inherent qualities of social capital that is instrumentally 
constructed and used. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
You see them everywhere when visiting developing countries: people who earn their livelihood 
from informal employment on the streets and in the crowded marketplaces. A table with a few 
bananas or a handful of matchboxes might be their only economic investment which they hope to 
earn from. The discussion in this dissertation arises from my year-long fascination with these 
micro-enterprises. I have often wondered how agents in the urban informal sector manage to keep 
their businesses running with limited economic means. After having studied social capital 
theories, I became interested in finding out whether social bonds might be a potential resource for 
the agents in this environment. I will in this dissertation study opportunities and limitations for the 
agents’ instrumental use of social bonds as social capital that ensures easier access to a scarce 
resource.  
The discussion of the instrumental use of social capital requires precision in what social 
capital is perceived to denote. Social capital has been ascribed a range of meanings during the last 
few years. Putnam, as an example, has equalled social capital with organisational activity, and 
outlined the co-variance between local organisations and level of democracy (Putnam, Leonardi & 
Nanetti 19931). This definition does not embrace social capital as a strategic asset in the fight for 
scarce resources.  I will argue that an instrumental, agent-oriented view of social capital is 
required for this analysis. This view includes the perspective of instrumental agents intentionally 
establishing social bonds and mobilising resources through existing bonds as a part of their 
economic strategy. A very important aspect of this concept is that the social bonds that might 
constitute social capital are rooted in larger social aggregates or networks. 
The discussion of the instrumental use of social capital has several contributions to the 
social capital literature as it reveals qualities of social capital that are not often debated in social 
capital theories. I will argue that instrumentally constructed and used social capital contributes to a 
local level instability. This finding stands in opposition to most assumptions about the qualities of 
social capital. In addition, the debate about the instrumental use of social capital will provide 
                                                 
1 Although this much quoted book has several authors, Putnam has later been the author most associated 
with this social capital theory.  I will thus only refer to Putnam when discussing this specific view of 
social capital. 
2 
arguments in favour of recognising a strong interaction between economic and social capital. The 
acknowledgement of the interaction of different forms of capital is often omitted when 
development agencies debate social capital as a resource for the very poor.  
The micro-enterprises in the informal2 urban economy constitute an interesting point of 
departure for a study of the instrumental use of social bonds as social capital. Informal economic 
activities stand out as unregulated by the institutions of society, in a context where similar 
activities are regulated3 (Portes & Castells 1989:12). Despite its heterogeneity, it is possible to 
outline some basic characteristics of the informal sector. As early as in 1972, the informal sector 
was described as characterised by small-scale operations, labour-intensive activities and adapted 
technology (ILO 1972:6). The size, flexibility and lack of technology found in many micro-
enterprises in the urban informal sector most likely compel the agents in this sector to use other 
forms of capital as a part of their business strategies. Instrumental use of social capital will thus be 
seen as an important part of the business strategies of agents operating in this specific economic 
sector. 
The choice to focus upon the instrumental construction and use of social capital is 
explained by the fact that I believe this to be the prevalent form of social capital in this specific 
environment. I have also chosen this analytic perspective because I believe that an analysis of 
instrumentally constructed and used social capital opens for a very fruitful discussion of social 
capital in general. It should nevertheless be noted that the agents in the urban informal sector 
operate in complex social, economic and cultural environments that might influence their business 
strategies. The analysis of the instrumental use of social capital should be perceived as describing 
only one of many important aspects of business strategies in the urban informal sector.  
THE OBUNGA CASE 
The case that provides the empirical material for the discussion is taken from the Lake Victoria 
fisheries. The specific setting to be studied is Obunga, an informal urban settlement on the Kenyan 
side of Lake Victoria. In this sector, micro-enterprises specialise in frying Nile perch skeletons4 
that are by-products from the formal fish processing companies. Fibres of flesh which remain on 
the skeleton after filleting make the Nile perch skeletons acceptable food in a region characterised 
by the scarcity of fish-protein. The skeletons are washed, dried and fried by Obunga agents before 
being sold to regional markets for human consumption. The informal fish-processing industry is 
seen as generating good profit margins, and many people move to Obunga to participate in this 
business. 
                                                 
2 The use of the term ‘informal economy’ has been widely criticised to be ‘loose’ and ‘unclear’. I will 
nevertheless choose to apply it in this dissertation as it embraces notions of economic activity that is not 
easily covered by other classifications (see Vaa 1991:124) 
3 It is however important to acknowledge that the informal sector in many cases is subject to some 
government taxes and regulations, but to a much lesser extent than the formal sector. Vaa states that in 
cases where taxes are paid in the informal sector, the taxable income is not based on written accounts 
(1991:124) 
4 The informants in Obunga refer to Nile perch skeletons as; ‘skeletons’, ‘fish’, ‘frames’, ‘carcasses’ or 
‘mgongo wazi’ (Swahili term meaning ‘bare back’. It refers to the fact that the fillets are removed from 
the fish carcass) 
3 
Each micro-enterprise is led by a wuontich5, a work leader responsible for the acquisition 
and processing of skeletons. In Obunga, the majority of these wuontich are female6. The wuontich 
stands out as the leader of the enterprise as she employs workers who wash, dry and fry the 
skeleton. She owns her own frying pan called djiko, rents a plot where she conducts her business, 
and has her own business budget. The wuontich will be placed at the centre of the discussion, as it 
is her instrumental construction and use of social capital to obtain Nile perch skeletons that 
constitute the core of the debate. Analytic focus upon the wuontich is a conscious choice 
motivated by her position in the work organisation. The wuontich is responsible for her own 
business, and she thus has to make consecutive choices to ensure the continuation of her business 
activity. The wuontich’ particular situation opens for the study of instrumental use of social 
capital. 
The wuontich’ business strategies in Obunga constitute a fruitful point of entry for a study 
of the instrumental use of social capital for two other reasons. The first reason is found in the 
distribution system. Nile perch skeletons are brought from the processing plants to Obunga by 
jawero7, or middlemen, who have a monopoly on the distribution of skeletons. As the skeletons 
are rarely distributed according to formalised rules, the wuontich presumably needs a personal 
relationship with the jawero in order to obtain supplies. I will explore to what extent social bonds 
between jawero and wuontich constitute social capital that might be instrumentally mobilised by 
the wuontich, and thus increase her access to skeletons. 
The second reason for applying a social capital perspective in this analysis has to do with 
the specific social realities of this area. Obunga, as an informal urban settlement, attracts migrants 
from rural areas in search of a livelihood. As many wuontich lack social contacts in Obunga, they 
organise saving associations that facilitate their access to economic resources. The wuontich’ 
perception of social contacts as a potential resource makes the social capital perspective 
interesting. In addition, it opens for an instrumental, agent-oriented view of social capital as the 
purposive construction of social bonds that might facilitate access to other resources seems to be a 
part of the Obunga reality. 
The organisation of the skeleton industry provides a methodological advantage in the 
study of the instrumental use of social capital. Approximately 40 micro-enterprises are clustered 
together in the same field. They all belong to the same umbrella organisation, but are 
economically independent of each other. This multitude of enterprises in the same socio-economic 
setting makes it possible to compare data from several informants operating in the same 
environment. 
The specific position of the Obunga wuontich represents an interesting point of departure 
for the study of instrumental use of social capital in the fight for scarce resources. The wuontich’ 
responsibility for a micro-enterprise makes the study of instrumentality possible. Instrumental use 
of social capital becomes interesting because the wuontich needs personal contact with the jawero 
to obtain skeletons. In addition, many of the wuontich are migrants who lack old social networks, 
                                                 
5 Plural from of wuontich is wegitich. In this dissertation wuontich will be used both in singular and plural 
form of the word.  
6 Thus the henceforth reference to the wuontich as  ‘she’. 
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but who engage in the construction of saving associations. This makes data on the instrumental 
construction and use of social capital accessible. 
 The findings from the Obunga case study will be related to the larger social capital debate. 
Yin states that in order to be able to generalise from a single case to a more overall theoretical 
debate, the discussion must stand in continuous dialogue with theoretical contributions in the field 
(Yin 1989:40). My use of a social capital perspective in the analysis, the continuos discussion with 
other theoretical contributions, and efforts to critically challenge my own findings will enable me 
to compare the findings from Obunga with the more general debate on social capital (Kvale 
1997:198). 
ORGANISATION OF THE DISCUSSION 
This dissertation consists of six basic chapters. Chapter two opens with a discussion of different 
theoretical perspectives on social capital. I present the views of central theorists and present 
arguments in favour of applying an instrumental, agent-oriented view of social capital in the 
analysis of this specific field. Aspects of gender-specific social capital, and social capital as a 
limitation to business prosperity, will also be included in the theoretical framework. 
Chapter three provides background information on the context of the skeleton industry. 
This information is relevant because it sets the backdrop for the instrumental construction and use 
of social capital among the Obunga wuontich. The material presented in this chapter will also 
stand in relation to chapter six, which discusses the wuontich’ use of social capital under dramatic 
contextual change. 
Chapter four outlines the methodological strategy applied during fieldwork and 
subsequent analysis of the empirical material. Potential influences on the material collected will be 
discussed, and space will be devoted to reflections upon my own role as a researcher.  
Chapters five and six present the discussion of the wuontich’ instrumental use of social 
capital. Chapter five seeks to explore whether social capital can be understood to be a strategic 
asset in the fight for scarce resources. I also discuss whether an instrumental, agent-oriented view 
of social capital is applicable to this analysis. In addition, I will debate whether the theoretical 
assumption of the limiting qualities of social capital holds in this field. These discussions will 
provide insight into the factors that influence the wuontich’ instrumental construction and use of 
social capital. This will provide material for a more general debate on the value of instrumentally 
constructed social capital to the Obunga wuontich. 
 Chapter six addresses the wuontich’ construction and use of social capital under dramatic 
contextual change. The focus of the discussion is opportunities and limitations to the use of 
instrumentally constructed social capital under dramatic contextual changes. EU regulations, 
seasonal variations, declining supplies and conflict will be seen as dramatic contextual changes 
that affect the organisation of the skeleton industry and thus the use of social capital. The 
discussion of the use of social capital under these conditions will provide new insight into the 
flexibility and the nature of instrumentally constructed social capital. 
                                                                                                                                               
7 Plural from of jawero is jowero. In this dissertation jawero will be used both in the singular and plural 
form of the word. The jawero are most often male. Thus the henceforth reference to the jawero as ‘he’. 
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Chapter seven concludes the discussion by setting the findings from Obunga in relation 
to other theoretical contributions on social capital. I ask whether instrumentally constructed 
social capital, which may be a flexible resource to the individual agent, might contribute to 
increased instability at an aggregate level. This leads to a debate on how the relation between 
social capital and development should be perceived. I also present arguments in favour of 
acknowledging that economic capital might be required in order to make resources flow through 
social bonds. This perspective is often omitted in discussions of social capital and I argue that 
this finding indicates that the very poor might not be capable of realising the full potential of 
social capital in this setting. 
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2.     THEORISING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will explore whether there are theoretical contributions that explain how agents 
instrumentally use social bonds to obtain a scarce resource. The concept of social capital will be 
used to shed light upon this issue. There are two main reasons for choosing to apply a social 
capital perspective in the analysis. First of all, social capital theories embrace a vision of social 
relations as a strategic asset to the possessor. In addition, the concept of social capital has been 
broadly used by development agencies to explain economic development in the urban informal 
sector (e.g. World Bank 1998). One might thus assume that the concept of social capital has 
potential analytic value for an analysis of the informal by-products sector in Kenya. 
Social capital is widely recognised as an adequate tool in understanding how social 
relations can generate prosperity (Woolcock 1998:168, Portes 1995:12). The extensive use of the 
concept to explain a broad range of social realities has, however, led to an explosion in the number 
of interpretations of what social capital actually imply (Woolcock 1998:159, Portes 1998:2). In 
order to achieve an adequate theoretical framework for this specific analysis, it is essential to 
develop an adapted understanding of the concept. I will thus present central contributions to social 
capital theory, and subsequently argue why the analysis must embrace an understanding of the 
agent as using social capital instrumentally to acquire resources. This perception will be termed an 
‘instrumental, agent-oriented’ view of social capital. The instrumental, agent-oriented view of 
social capital will be supplemented with other theoretical perspectives. I will introduce the notion 
of gender-specific social capital, which implies that men and women might have unequal 
opportunities to construct and use social capital. This perspective becomes particularly interesting 
as the majority of the informants in this study are female. An understanding of social capital as a 
potential limitation to the agents’ business prosperity will also constitute a part of the theoretical 
framework. This section will outline the fact that the social relations that might well be seen as a 
resource, might also additionally impose expectations of group-oriented behaviour on the agent. I 
will argue that these expectations might limit the agent’s scope of action and thus hinder her 
business prosperity. 
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GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
It might be difficult to speak of a ‘general’ understanding of social capital, as this is an issue 
that is broadly debated in both theory and policy arenas. I will nevertheless briefly attempt to 
outline the understanding of social capital that currently dominates the policies of the World 
Bank, an institution that sets the tone for many other development agencies in the world. 
 The World Bank has aimed at utilising the concept of social capital when outlining 
policy positions in relation to poverty reduction strategies (World Bank homepage 2001). This 
institution sees social capital as an important resource for the very poor. In their policy 
documents the World Bank claims that social capital will contribute to local level trust and 
stability that will enhance economic transactions among the poor. It is stated that the existence 
of social capital contributes to cost reduction for firms and entrepreneurs and also enables poor 
people to start small enterprises and increase their income (World Bank homepage 2001). Social 
capital is seen as a factor with an important role to play when attempting to reduce poverty 
levels in developing countries (World Bank 1998).  
 The view presented in this dissertation differs from the World Bank’s perception of 
social capital. I will focus on how individual agents instrumentally use their social bonds as 
social capital. This perspective of social capital is not mentioned in the World Bank’s poverty 
reduction strategies. I will argue that not only is instrumentally constructed social capital the 
prevalent form of social capital in Obunga, it can also provide valuable insights to the social 
capital debate that dominates both policy arenas and academic circles. The discussion of 
instrumentally constructed social capital will provide arguments that will enable me to argue 
against the views of the World Bank and social capital theorists in the concluding chapter. 
AN ADAPTED UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
In order to be able to discuss instrumentally constructed social capital, an adapted theoretical 
understanding of social capital must be developed. I will present central theoretical contributions 
in the social capital field and argue why I perceive an instrumental, agent-oriented view of social 
capital to be appropriate for the analysis of the Obunga wuontich. First of all, I will attempt to 
trace the lines of social capital thinking back to classical sociological thought. 
The notion of social relations as an enabling force is by no means a new thought in 
sociology. Classical theorists like Marx and Durkheim emphasised the positive consequences of 
social relations for societal development. Marx claimed that collective action would be a way to 
change oppressive socio-economic structures, while Durkheim saw social bonds as a 
countermeasure to anomie in modern society (Marx [1867] 1967, Durkheim [1897] 1951).   
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Portes acknowledges the links between classical sociological thought and social capital theories 
as he states that the concept of social capital recaptures insights from the very beginning of the 
sociological discipline (1998:2).  
Recent literature on social capital can be organised along to various axes. In this chapter 
I will attempt to categorise the discussion of social capital according to two dimensions. The 
first dimension addresses whether theorists perceive social capital to be a resource for groups or 
for individuals, while the second discussion explores whether agency or norms are seen to be 
the source of social capital. Categorisation according to these dimensions will enable me to pin 
down the specific aspects of social capital theories that are relevant for my field of study. I will 
then move on to establish an adapted understanding of social capital. This adapted 
understanding will embrace a perspective of instrumental agents as constructing and using 
social capital to obtain resources.  The objective is to develop an understanding that will be 
applicable to an analysis of social capital in the urban informal sector.  
 A resource for groups or for individuals? 
Whether social capital is perceived as a resource for individuals or for groups marks a dividing 
line in writings on social capital. In what follows I will present central contributions in social 
capital writing and establish whether they perceive social capital to be a resource for individuals or 
for larger aggregates of people. 
 Putnam’s work on social capital is widely recognised and discussed. He claimed to see an 
interrelationship between organisational activity at the local level and degree of democracy in 
society as whole (Putnam et al 1993). Social capital is to Putnam “(...) features of social 
organisation such as trust, norms and networks that can improve efficiency in society by 
facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam et al 1993:167). Norms regulate the actions of members 
so that they comply with collective rules. The collective action that arises from this compliance 
will in turn strengthen overall solidarity in society (Putnam et al 1993: 169). Social capital is a 
resource for the society as a whole, according to Putnam. While social capital originates in local 
level norms and trust, its effects must, according to him, be measured at the group or society level 
(Putnam et al 1993). 
Peter Evans has also used the concept of social capital to explain how networks can be 
understood as a resource for society as a whole. He sees local level social capital as leading to 
state-society synergy, understood as an efficient collaboration between the state and civil society. 
State-society synergy is, according to him, an important prerequisite for societal development 
(Evans 1996). Evans disagrees with Putnam on what is to be identified as the sources of social 
capital. Where Putnam sees norms and trust as prerequisites for social capital, Evans emphasises 
the importance of links between state and society for the existence of social capital (Evans 
1996:1124). Evans and Putnam have diverging views on the foundation of social capital, but they  
9 
 
 
 
both tend to explain social capital as a micro-level quality that is potentially beneficial to larger 
groups. The individual as constructor and benefactor of social capital is not emphasised in their 
theories. 
 Coleman has devoted more effort in depicting social capital as a resource for the 
individual agent. He sees social capital as an aspect of social structure that facilitates certain 
actions for individuals that participate in the structure (1990:302). Social capital is the value of 
social structure to the individuals (1990:305). By this statement he conveys his theoretical position 
of methodological individualism, in which the focal point is agency. Coleman’s agents are 
rational, and although somewhat constrained by their social environment, they are in a constant 
search to optimise their possibilities by their own actions. Construction of social capital is thus 
beneficial because the individuals can access resources through their social contacts (Coleman 
1990:309). Coleman’s view of social capital is on this point in opposition to Putnam and Evans’ 
focus on social capital as a resource for larger aggregates of people. 
 Bourdieu was the first to coin the term ‘social capital’ in a discussion of education and 
schooling in contemporary France (Bourdieu 1984). To Bourdieu, social capital is “(…) the 
aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network 
(…)” (1984:248). He emphasises that membership in a group can give each of the members the 
benefit of collectively generated capital (Bourdieu 1984:248). This social capital might eventually 
be converted into various kinds of economic benefit for the agents (Bourdieu 1984:241). The 
agents use their social relations as a strategic asset to acquire a more favourable socio-economic 
position (Bourdieu 1984). It should be emphasised that this reading of Bourdieu might not reflect 
the totality of his theoretical position. Although Bourdieu embraces an understanding of agents as 
benefiting from social capital, he is preoccupied with transcending the division between agent and 
structure (Ritzer 1992:579). Bourdieu simultaneously offers a perspective of agents strongly 
dictated by internalised structures8. My reading of the agent perspective in Bourdieu’s writings is 
motivated by the value of his subjectivist perspective in relation to the subsequent analysis. I will 
choose to focus on this aspect of Bourdieu’s writings because these perspectives help explain the 
construction and use of social capital in Obunga. It should nevertheless be noted that my reference 
to the subjectivist perspective in Bourdieu’s writings only represents a selected perspective in his 
overall theoretical framework.  
 Another theorist that has deeply delved into the various understandings of social capital is 
Alejandro Portes. In much-quoted articles on the subject, he has aimed at organising and 
explaining central writings on the issue (Portes 1995 and 1998, Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993). 
Portes has developed an understanding of the agent as the primary benefactor of social capital 
(1995). According to Portes, social capital is the ability of agents to command scarce resources by  
                                                 
8 Some of the objectivist perspectives in Bourdieu’s writings will emerge later in the discussion. 
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the virtue of membership in some kind of social network (1995:12). The analytical interest is in 
the agent as a possessor of resources through social bonds with other agents. Although Portes 
points out that the possession of a social network may indeed represent limitations on the agent’s 
scope of  
action, it is the agent’s affiliation with the network and not the network as such that is described. 
Portes thus falls in the category of analysts that view social capital as a resource for the individual, 
rather than for the group as a whole. 
 The presentation of different contributions to social capital theory has showed that various 
theorists have diverging perceptions of whether social capital should be treated as a resource for 
individuals or for groups. Still another dividing line in social capital writing remains to be 
explored; whether the source of social capital should be sought in norms or instrumental action.
  
Instrumental action or norms as the source of social capital? 
This discussion will explore what various theorists identify as the force that makes social 
networks, and thereby social capital, emerge. Is the existence of social networks a result of 
instrumental action or a mere consequence of norms which enhance collective action? 
 In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that Putnam believes that networks arise 
because agents comply with local level norms and thus join groups and organisations (Putnam et 
al 1993:167).  Putnam actually refers to trust and norms as more than sources of social capital; 
trust and norms he claims, are social capital in themselves because they enhance the efficiency of 
society at an aggregate level (1993: 167). In Putnam’s writings, norms rather than instrumental 
action must be perceived as the force that makes social capital, in the form of social networks, 
emerge. 
 Although Peter Evans, as earlier discussed, shares Putnam’s view of social capital as 
beneficial at an aggregate level, he differs from Putnam in his opinion on the sources of social 
capital. In his discussion of synergy, as efficient networks between state and society, Evans 
emphasises that both embeddedness and complementarity must exist to achieve synergy (Evans 
1996:1130). Embeddedness refers to interactions, norms and loyalties that exist at the local level 
(Evans 1996:1121). Complementarity implies that both civil society institutions and government 
institutions must make conscious efforts to develop structures of collaboration between the two 
levels. Evans thus seems to indicate that social capital originates both in norms and in instrumental 
action.  
 James Coleman, like Evans, deals with the question of sources of social capital by 
including both norms and agency in his explanation (1990). He depicts a rational agent influenced  
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by his environment (1990). Coleman claims that norms and trust are necessary preconditions of 
social capital, but underlines that agents comply with these norms as a rational action (Coleman 
1990:309). Coleman goes as far as stating that norms of reciprocity are actually products of 
instrumental action, created by agents who realise that they can best serve their own needs by 
complying to a collective structure of mutual obligations (1990:310). Agency should thus be seen 
as the basic source of social capital in Coleman’s writings. 
 Bourdieu emphasises the importance of instrumental action for the construction and use 
of social capital (1986)9. Networks are not naturally given, he claims, but are products of endless 
efforts by agents or collectives to secure material or symbolic profits (Bourdieu 1986:249). 
Indeed, Bourdieu recognises that solidarity must exist in order to enable the agent to construct 
networks. The agent’s instrumental use of social relations to achieve what he calls ‘distinction’, 
denoting a favourable position in society, is emphasised (Bourdieu 1984). Although Bourdieu falls 
in the category of analysts who view instrumental action as a source of social capital, it is 
important to recognise that he simultaneously describes the construction of social capital as having 
structural constraints (Ritzer 1992:578). Instrumental action is what makes social capital come 
into being, but underlying structures of power and class will define how social capital is 
constructed (Bourdieu 1984:468).  
  Portes claims that social capital is a product of two types of motivation: motivation of 
self-interest and motivation of compliance with social expectations (1995:13). Sources of social 
capital cannot be said to be one or the other but are rather a compound of these two kinds of 
motivation. Portes consequently sees both norms and instrumental action as sources of social 
capital. 
 By presenting different theorists’ views of social capital I have shown that there are 
diverging opinions on whether norms or instrumental action is the source of social capital. Some 
analysts include both perspectives in their explanation. The important task is to develop an 
understanding of social capital that will prove applicable to a study of social capital as a strategic 
resource in the urban informal sector. This adapted understanding of the concept will be 
developed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See previous subchapter for information on how I choose to read Bourdieu in this dissertation.  
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An instrumental, agent-oriented view 
The various perceptions of social capital as a resource for individuals or groups, and of the sources 
of social capital, can be fitted into the following chart: 
 
Chart 1. Theoretical perceptions of social capital10 
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We need to pin down which of these views is adequate for the analysis of the strategic use of 
social capital in the urban informal sector. I will argue that a view that recognises the individual as 
the primary benefactor of social capital is needed for this analysis. This view will be referred to as 
an ‘agent-oriented’ view of social capital. Furthermore, an understanding of instrumental action as 
the primary source of social capital will be applied. This view will be referred to as an 
‘instrumental’ approach to social capital. 
                                                 
10 Bourdieu would probably resent being placed in this chart as he claims to have transcended the division 
between subjectivism and objectivism (Ritzer 1992:580). For the visualisation of the theoretical positions 
in this field I have nevertheless chosen to place his theoretical position inside chart 1. 
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  The justification of applying an instrumental, agent-oriented view of social capital lies 
partly in the specific features of the urban informal sector. The urban informal setting in 
developing countries is often characterised by a large influx of migrants. Traditional networks 
are often dissolved when people migrate from the rural areas and new social bonds have to be 
constructed in the urban setting. Hofferth and Iceland sustain this assumption. They have 
studied rural and urban households and have found that rural inhabitants were more likely to 
receive assistance from family and kin than their urban counterparts (Hofferth & Iceland 
1998:596). This finding sustains the assumption of dissolved traditional networks in the urban 
setting. The inhabitants in the urban areas are often in a pressured economic situation and they 
have to apply coping-strategies in order to secure their livelihoods. Muller and Plantenga agree 
with this argument as they state that the construction of informal networks can be understood as 
a survival strategy for women in an urban context (1990:24). I argue that agency is a more 
prevalent source of social capital than norms in this environment. Instrumentality can not only 
be perceived as a source of social capital when new bonds are established, social capital can 
also be seen as instrumentally constructed when an agent deliberately transforms her social 
bonds into social capital. An example of this is when family relations are deliberately 
transformed into social capital by agents using these bonds actively to obtain resources. In such 
cases the source of social capital can also be seen to be instrumental action. 
Not only will I see instrumental action as the primary source of social capital in 
Obunga, instrumental action will also be viewed as the force that makes resources flow through 
social bonds. This perception will enable an analysis not only of the establishment of social 
bonds that might potentially constitute social capital, but also of agents instrumentally using 
their social bonds as tools to obtain resources. I am preoccupied with both the instrumental 
construction and use of social capital, and subsequent reference to instrumentally constructed 
social capital will thus also include perspectives of instrumental use of social capital. 
Even though the analytical focus of this dissertation rests upon the instrumental 
construction and use of social relations, it is important to acknowledge that agents never act in 
the absence of social norms. I will, however, focus upon instrumental action as a source of 
social capital. This choice in motivated by the fact that I see this to be the prevalent source of 
social capital in Obunga. In addition, I believe that a discussion of instrumentality as source of 
social capital provides valuable contributions to the social capital debate. 
An instrumental, agent-oriented view has strong similarities with rational choice theories. 
There are, however, elements that make the instrumental, agent-oriented approach slightly 
different from a rational choice perspective. The assumption that micro-level strategic actions are 
influenced by their social context underlies this discussion. The explicit focus on structural 
influence on micro-level action makes this approach different from most rational choice theories. 
Although most rational choice theorists acknowledge structural influence on action, many of them 
do not treat this issue explicitly. One of the great dilemmas in rational choice theory has been to 
explain external contextual influence on the individual’s choice (Ritzer 1992:446). The explicit 
focus on structural influence on individual action makes the instrumental, agent-oriented view of 
social capital differ from most rational choice theories on this issue. It will later become evident 
that this focus is included in the theoretical framework. 
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An important perspective in the adapted understanding of social capital is inspired by 
Bourdieu. He states that a group provides each of its members with a ‘credential’ which entitles 
them to certain benefits (1986: 249). As the agents in the informal sector might have several 
instrumentally constructed business relationships, it is important to distinguish these from social 
capital. I will therefore emphasise that relationships which constitute social capital for the 
possessor have their origin and legitimacy in a social group or network. This can, for example, be 
manifested in the fact that two agents who perform a business transaction are members of the 
same group, and that the transaction is facilitated by their shared network affiliation. This 
understanding of social capital excludes ordinary one-to-one business relationships from being 
viewed as social capital. 
I have introduced an understanding of agents constructing and using social capital 
instrumentally to obtain scarce resources. I will, however, claim that these agents to some extent 
are restricted in their construction and use of social capital by underlying gender values. This is 
an example of a structural constraint that influences individual action. The view of gender 
values as influencing action implies that male and female agents might have unequal 
opportunities to construct and use social capital. I will call this perspective ‘gender-specific 
social capital’.  
The perspective of social capital as potentially limiting to the agent’s business prosperity 
will also constitute a facet of the theoretical framework. Social capital is commonly perceived as a 
potential resource to the possessor. I will introduce an understanding of social capital as 
simultaneously having the potential to limit the possessors’ business prosperity. This potential 
limitation takes the form of pressure towards group-oriented behaviour. The potentially limiting 
capacity of social capital will be included as a part of the adapted understanding of social capital. 
This perspective represents yet another emphasis on the importance of recognising instrumental 
agents as influenced by surrounding structures. 
GENDER-SPECIFIC SOCIAL CAPITAL 
This discussion will explicate gender values as influencing the construction and use of social 
capital among the Obunga agents. This view implies that I argue that men and women might 
have unequal opportunities to construct and use social capital instrumentally to obtain resources. 
This perspective is particularly relevant because the agents studied in this dissertation are 
predominantly women who instrumentally use social capital in the form of social bonds with 
male agents to obtain resources. I will start by presenting arguments in favour of seeing social 
capital as gender-specific. Theoretical perspectives on how gender values can be seen as 
influencing instrumental agents will then be considered. Bourdieu’s theories of ‘habitus’ are 
central in this context. 
Many theorists have argued in favour of recognising the gender discriminating structures 
that exist in the informal sector. Hoyman for example, underscores that women are often the losers 
in the struggle for a livelihood in the urban informal sector (1987:76). Muller and Plantega 
emphasise that gender discriminating structures penetrate the informal sector (1990). These 
arguments emphasise gender as an important dimension to consider when studying the informal 
sector. 
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The gender dimension has also been mentioned in relation to social capital theories. Susan 
Johnson states that the concept of social capital contains dangerous gender-biases, and that these 
biases have not been fully scrutinised and exposed (Johnson 1999:110). She draws attention to 
what she calls ‘the dark side of social capital’. This expression denotes the fact that the inclusion 
in social networks of some implies exclusion of others, and these ‘others’ might, according to 
Johnson, often be women (1999:113). Johnson further states that women might easily be barred 
from equal participation with men in social networks due to their reproductive role and their 
inferior socio-economic position in many societies (Johnson 1999:113). Nan Lin is another 
theorist who claims that men and women might have different possibilities to utilise social capital 
as a resource (Lin 2000:787). Johnson’s and Lin’s arguments in combination with other 
statements that emphasise the existence of gender discriminating structures in the informal sector 
speak in favour of applying a gender perspective in the analysis of social capital in Obunga. 
I will thus apply a gender-specific view of social capital. This view embraces a vision of 
men and women as having unequal opportunities to construct and use social capital as a strategic 
resource in Obunga. Underlying this perspective is the assumption that female agents are more 
discriminated against in their use of social capital than their male counterparts. I assume that the 
reason for this gender-specificity is the existence of underlying gender values. Bourdieu’s theories 
help explain how instrumental agents can be limited in their actions by underlying structures. 
 Bourdieu embraces a vision of instrumental agents who are simultaneously constrained by 
social structures. The term ‘habitus’ describes internalised social structures (1984:468). These 
structures are both products and are produced by the social world (Ritzer 1992:579). Although 
Bourdieu seeks to explain that ‘habitus’ contains class values, gender values can be perceived as a 
form of ‘habitus’ that influences the actions of individuals. This helps explain how instrumental 
agents are limited by gender values when they construct and use social capital. According to 
Bourdieu’s theories, the limitations that ‘habitus’ imposes originate from cognitive structures 
which are produced and reshaped through individual actions. Such cognitive structures in 
combination with more explicitly stated gender values will be seen as limiting the female agents in 
their efforts to construct and use social capital as a strategic resource. Social capital will thus be 
recognised as a gender-specific resource in the analysis of the Obunga agents. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A LIMITATION 
The instrumental, agent-oriented view of social capital explains how the agents’ deliberate 
construction of sociability can prove to be a strategic asset in the fight for scarce resources. 
What it does not explain is how the social networks that constitute social capital simultaneously 
may limit the agents’ scope of action. I will argue that the agents are limited by social capital 
because they comply with norms enforcing group-oriented behaviour, in order to maintain their 
profitable relations with the social network. Compliance with norms enforcing group-oriented 
behaviour can be seen as imposing a limitation on the agent as she becomes less able to make 
choices that protect her own business interests. These arguments will constitute the basis of the 
discussion of social capital as a potential limitation to the agent’s business prosperity. 
Early as in classical sociology, Simmel pointed out the conflict between community 
solidarity and individual freedom in his essay on ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life’ 
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([1902]1978). Simmel recognised the limitations that community norms can place on the 
individual, and how participation in collective structures can limit the agent’s scope of choice 
([1902] 1978). Simmel’s contributions to this discussion are statements on how the affiliation 
with a social aggregate has potential negative effects for individual prosperity. It is, however, 
important to understand the forces that make the social network limit the agent’s access to 
resources. 
The limitations imposed on the individual primarily take the form of expectations of 
group-oriented behaviour. Portes embraces this dimension as he explains how restrictions on 
individual freedom arise because group participation necessarily calls for conformity (Portes 
1998:17). Membership in a network obliges the participant to comply with group norms.  The 
compliance with norms governing group-oriented behaviour might have limiting effects on 
individual business prosperity as the interest of the group undeniably often collides with the 
business interest of the individual. 
An interesting question to ask is why instrumental agents, constructing and using social 
bonds as a strategic asset, choose to comply with norms governing group- oriented behaviour. I 
will argue that the agents comply with norms as a strategic action in order to ensure the right to 
economic benefits from the social network. In order to uphold potentially profitable contacts 
with the network, the individual might have to suppress her own interests in order to satisfy the 
group. The compliance with group norms is the only way to maintain the potentially beneficial 
liaisons with the network. This is an example of the duality of social networks. In some ways it 
can be seen as positive social capital that facilitates access to resources for the individual agents. 
On the other hand, the social network imposes limitations upon the individual that might limit 
the agent’s scope of action and thus hamper her business prosperity. 
The discussion will thus incorporate a vision of social capital as simultaneously 
enabling and limiting. Social capital in the form of social networks might facilitate access to a 
resource. Arguments presented above showed, however, that the social network might limit the 
agent’s scope of action in that she feels obliged to comply with group norms in order to uphold 
contact with the network. The ambiguity of social capital as a resource will thus be recognised 
as I incorporate an understanding of social capital as a potential limitation to the agent’s 
business strategies. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The aim of this chapter was to evolve an understanding of social capital that would be 
applicable to the analysis of social capital as a strategic asset in the urban informal sector.  I 
have argued that an individual, agent-oriented view of social capital is required for this analysis. 
This theoretical framework has been supplemented with views of gender-specific social capital 
and social capital as a potential limitation to individual business strategies. 
In order to explore whether these theoretical assumptions reflect Obunga reality, several 
questions must be asked. First of all, it becomes essential to explore whether the agents perceive 
social capital to facilitate their access to resources in the urban informal sector. It is also necessary 
to determine whether the agents actually construct and use social networks instrumentally in order 
to mobilise resources through their social bonds.  I utilise a discussion of the value of social 
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capital to explore whether social capital is considered an important asset to the Obunga wuontich. 
In addition, I explore to what extent the agents see themselves as being limited by their 
membership in a social network that might constitute social capital. These discussions will enable 
me to explore the opportunities and constraints for the agents’ instrumental use of social capital as 
a strategic resource, and thus provide valuable knowledge on the nature and importance of social 
capital as a resource to the agents working in this specific setting.  
In order to achieve a full understanding of social capital as a potential asset to the agents 
in this setting, I will also ask if social capital is a flexible resource that might be used in situations 
of dramatic contextual change. Dramatic contextual change will be seen as contextual changes 
that induce significant changes in the organisation of the skeleton industry. The study of how the 
agents are limited or enabled in their instrumental use of social capital under such changed 
circumstances will help in answering whether social capital can be perceived as an important 
resource to agents operating in the skeleton industry. This discussion will also address the 
question of gender-specificity as related to social capital, as I explore whether women and men 
have unequal opportunities to utilise social capital in circumstances of dramatic contextual change 
In order discuss these topics questions it is necessary to establish what I perceive social 
capital and the instrumental construction and use of social capital to denote in this specific field. 
Social capital will in this particular context refer to social bonds rooted in family relations, saving 
group associations and work organisations. Instrumental use of these bonds will describe the 
wuontich’ deliberate attempts to access skeletons by evoking her shared social bonds with the 
jawero who controls the skeletons. Instrumental construction of social capital will find its 
empirical expression in deliberate efforts from agents to construct groups or networks that will 
ensure easier access to skeletons.  
All the above presented research questions will in combination help me understand the 
significance of social capital as a resource for the Obunga agents. These specific debates will 
enable me to depict the value and flexibility of social capital to the agents operating in this 
environment. These findings will provide contributions to the more general debate on social 
capital. These contributions will be presented in the concluding chapter. 
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3.  CONTEXTUALISING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
This dissertation applies a view of instrumental agents constructing and using social bonds to 
access resources. In order to discuss this topic it is necessary to explain the business relations in 
which social capital will be discussed as a potential resource. The wuontich’ instrumental use of 
social bonds with the jawero as social capital that might ensure easier access to Nile perch 
skeletons will constitute the core of the discussion in this dissertation. Information on the 
wuontich-jawero relation will be expanded upon in the second section of this chapter and should 
be viewed as essential for the understanding of the subsequent analysis. 
 The business relations in which social capital is used as a resource cannot be seen in 
isolation. It has to be placed in relation to the organisation of the informal fish-processing 
industry. A description of this industry will help delineate why the wuontich potentially needs to 
use her social bonds with the jawero as social capital in order to access Nile perch skeletons.  
 In order to understand all the surrounding forces that might influence the construction and 
use of social capital, information on the Lake Victoria fisheries and on the informal settlement of 
Obunga will be presented. This information will help depict the context in which the skeleton 
industry is situated. This chapter is organised in three sections and the second section should be 
perceived as containing the core material for the subsequent discussion. The first section presents 
the Lake Victoria fisheries and how changes in this sector affect the output of fish into the 
skeleton industry in Obunga. The second section provides information on the organisation of the 
skeleton industry while the third section depicts the informal settlement of Obunga, the area in 
which the skeleton industry is situated. 
 Some of the information presented in this chapter will have particular relevance for the 
discussion in chapter six. In that chapter, the use of social capital under dramatic contextual 
change will be used as a point of departure for a discussion of the flexibility of social capital. The 
dramatic contextual changes that will be discussed in chapter six are EU11 hygiene regulations, 
seasonal changes, declining supplies and conflict. Each of these contextual changes and symptoms 
of their influence on the informal fish-processing industry will be presented in this chapter.  
                                                 
11  The European Union 
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THE LAKE VICTORIA FISHERIES 
The informal fish-processing industry in Obunga depends on supplies from the industrialised fish-
processing plants. The informal fish-processing industry will thus be affected by changes in the 
formal fisheries. I will present some basic information on the Lake Victoria Fisheries, and attempt 
to outline how the Obunga agents are affected by the organisation and development of the formal 
fisheries sector. 
 The Lake Victoria fisheries are dominated by modern processing companies (Jansen, 
Abila & Owino 1999:10). The basis for the establishment of the modern fish factories was an 
explosion in the Nile perch stock of Lake Victoria in the late seventies and early eighties. The Nile 
perch was a new species introduced to the Lake in the 1950s. Being a predator, the Nile perch fed 
on the indigenous species in Lake Victoria, making it possible to multiply the Nile perch stock 
during a short period of time (Witte, Goudswaard, Katunzi, Mkumbo, Seehausen & Wanink 
1999:191). Catches steadily increased until 1991, but during the past few years the Lake Victoria 
fisheries have experienced declining catches (see chart 2). From 1995 to 1998 catches declined by 
approximately 10 percent. Most theorists agree that this development, in combination with the 
exploitation of the Lake Victoria biomass, gives reason for concern12 (Abila 2000). Many 
researchers claim that the decline in catches partly has its explanation in the stiff competition 
between the factories for supplies (e.g. Wilson 1996). As the factories take out the majority of the 
mature Nile perch from the Lake, the local population have turned to illegal fishing methods in 
order to obtain fish (Geheb 1999:118, Geheb and Binns 1997:85). These processes have in 
combination led to the fact that the biomass in Lake Victoria is not exploited in a sustainable 
manner (McCormick 1997). The catches are considerably smaller than a few years ago and many 
of the factories around the Lake are currently struggling to get supplies (Jansen et al 1999). 
 
Chart 2. Tonnes of Nile perch caught in Lake Victoria, Kenya, 1965-1998 
 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
13,000 16,998 16,581 26,914 88,589 185,101 181,888 158,876 
(Source:  Mugabe, Jansen and Ochieng 2000:3) 
 
  An informal industry has developed in response to the modern fish-processing factories 
(Geheb 1996). This industry specialises in processing by-products that are left after production 
inside the processing plants. As many as eight different by-products have potential use for human 
and animal consumption, as well as for industrial use. The skeleton industry in Obunga constitutes 
a part of this informal by-product industry.  
There is a market for by-products in the regions around the Lake Victoria and in national 
Kenyan markets. The reason for this is that the local population is blocked from access to mature 
Nile perch. This fish is directly taken to the processing plants, processed and sent to overseas 
markets (Abila & Jansen 1997:4). As the factories compete to obtain Nile perch, they pay a higher 
price for the supplies than the local population. Local Kenyans are confined to the consumption of 
                                                 
12 As will become evident later, this development is also felt by the informal fish-processors. 
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premature Nile perch, other fish species and by-products. Several studies indicate that the per 
capita consumption of fish in this region is declining and that this development is a source of 
malnutrition and food insecurity (Mogaka 1999).   
 Declining supplies from the formal fisheries can be seen as a dramatic contextual change 
that is experienced at the local level. This can be explained by the fact that the informal by-
products industry depends solely on supplies from the formal fish-processing plants, and 
variations in these supplies severely affect business prosperity in Obunga. Several informants in 
Obunga expressed that they had noticed that the catches from Lake Victoria had decreased and 
that the fish size was decreasing due to over-exploitation. Peter13, simultaneously operating as 
wuontich and jawero in Obunga, expresses how he has noticed these changes:  
There have been changes. Now the fish is very small compared to earlier. Earlier you could get 
skeletons weighing 3-10 kg. Now you even receive skeletons weighing only one kilogram from 
the factory.  
As the informal fish-processing industry depends on supplies from the factories, the agents in 
this sector acutely feel any decline in the production of Nile perch caused by over-exploitation 
of the resources in Lake Victoria. The discussion in chapter six on the use of social capital 
under dramatic contextual change will show that the construction and use of social capital 
among the wuontich is altered when the catches from Lake Victoria decrease. 
EU and International markets 
The EU and international markets are significant for understanding the skeleton industry in 
Obunga. As demand for Nile perch in these markets is decisive for the output of by-products into 
the skeleton industry, their influence on the local by-product industry is substantial. In this 
dissertation their influence is particularly seen in the EU-imposed hygiene regulations that 
prevented a large bulk of local inhabitants from entering factory premises (Mitullah 1998:62). 
This led to the introduction of a new distribution system in Obunga under which the jawero 
operated as middlemen between the Obunga agents and the factory. These EU hygiene regulations 
will be treated as a dramatic contextual change that affected the organisation of the skeleton 
industry.  
Following the explosion in the Nile perch stock in the 1980s there was a transition 
towards export of fish fillets (Abila & Jansen 1997). The most important markets for processed 
fillets are currently the EU, Israel and Japan. The orientation towards international markets has 
made the formal fish-processing industry dependent on international regulations. EU officials 
have been particularly worried over the hygienic standards in the fish-processing factories, and 
bans have on several occasions been launched on import of fish from Lake Victoria (Mitullah 
1998:60). These bans have been enforced in response to the failure of local factories to meet 
hygiene standards (Daily Nation 2000 a). The latest ban on fish import to the European Union was 
issued in February 1999, and it was a reaction to alleged fishing with pesticides. This ban lasted 
for over two years and was only recently lifted (Daily Nation 2000 b).  
                                                 
13 All the informants have been given fictitious names and are presented in appendix 2. 
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The EU has for a long time promoted the ISO14 9002 certificate as a basic requirement for 
processing routines in the factories (Jansen 2000). This certificate details the proper handling of 
fish in all parts of the production chain. This is of specific interest to the skeleton industry as it set 
standards for the handling of by-products from the factories. EU inspectors have assessed the 
distribution of by-products to the local population as unhygienic. As a response to this, several 
factories have introduced a system where a few agents are given a monopoly on the distribution of 
skeletons from the factories. Random individuals can no longer go to the processing plants to buy 
skeletons; they have become dependent on supplies from jawero taking the skeletons from the 
factory to Obunga. Peter acknowledges how EU regulations have affected the local system of 
distribution: 
The factory only wants to give skeletons to certain people. They do this because the EU thinks 
that is more hygienic. 
This new system giving a monopoly on distribution to a few individuals is a direct consequence of 
EU hygiene regulations. This is an example of how local level realities might be affected by 
bureaucratic decisions made in Brussels, and will in chapter six be discussed as a dramatic 
contextual change that has affected the construction and use of social capital among the Obunga 
agents.  
THE INFORMAL FISH-PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
In this section, the informal fish-processing industry will be presented15. An overview of the 
various work groups and the system of distribution is provided. This information is necessary in 
order to understand why the wuontich is so dependent on having personal relations with the 
jawero in order to get supplies, a reality which constitutes the basis for the discussion of social 
capital as a potential asset to the wuontich. In addition, a presentation of the Umbrella Group, the 
organisational body in the skeleton industry, will be given. During the period of fieldwork this 
group came in conflict with certain agents in the skeleton industry. This situation is in chapter six 
discussed as a dramatic contextual change that affected the construction and use of social capital 
for the Obunga agents. Information on this situation of conflict will thus be presented. The 
significance of gender values in this industry will also be discussed. Ultimately, information on 
seasonal variation and its impact on the skeleton industry will be presented. Season will later be 
discussed as a dramatic contextual change that influences the construction and use of social 
capital16. 
                                                 
14 International Standardisation Organisation 
15 As significant information on the informal fish processing industry and the informal settlement of 
Obunga is hard to find, the information presented here is based upon statements from informants. This 
information is also published in Steen-Johnsen (2000). 
16 It will later become evident that although seasonal variations have a cyclic character, they still have a 
dramatic impact on the organisation of the skeleton industry. 
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The organisation of the informal fish-processing industry 
The carcass industry is a complex work organisation with many levels. The three most significant 
positions are; jawero, wuontich and worker (see appendix 5). The jawero have a monopoly on the 
distribution of skeletons from the factory to the wuontich who specialise in processing skeletons 
and selling them to local and regional markets. The wuontich employ workers who cut, wash, dry, 
fry and pack the carcasses before they are sold.  
Earlier, anyone could go to the processing plant to obtain supplies. Currently, due to EU-
imposed hygiene requirements, the processing companies often only allow a limited number of 
people on their premises. These few people, the jawero, get a monopoly on the distribution of by-
products to the local population. The jawero transport skeletons from the factory to Obunga where 
they employ people to count and grade the skeletons. The skeletons are then distributed to the 
wuontich according to lists or personal preferences.  
The jawero stand out as powerful agents in the field. The mere appearance of them often 
suggests status and wealth. They are well dressed and their attention is sought after. The jawero 
were at the time of research exclusively men. There are examples of women attempting to enter 
into this business, but the men seem to counteract women who attempt to become jawero.  
Carcasses from the factories are distributed via the jawero to the wuontich. The wuontich, 
who are most often female, have their own small enterprises in processing and selling the 
skeletons. They own a frying pan (djiko) and employ workers to wash, cut, dry, fry and pack the 
skeletons. These workers are in that sense employees in the wuontich’ micro-enterprise. In 
Obunga, every wuontich owns her own wooden stall where the skeletons are hung to dry before 
they are processed. 
In order to remain in business the wuontich needs to get regular supplies. As the 
availability of supplies is often low, the wuontich has to make an extra effort to obtain resources. 
In order to access the skeletons she has to have some kind of personal contact with the jawero. It 
is her potential use of social bonds with the jawero to access skeletons that will constitute the 
starting point for a discussion of the instrumental use of social capital in this dissertation. 
The Umbrella Group and the conflict with the Mgongo Wazi Group 
The Umbrella Group is the official regulating body in the skeleton industry17. This group 
organises and co-ordinates all work-related activities in the skeleton industry. The office bearers 
are officially elected with government officials present. In order to operate on any level in the 
skeleton business, membership in the Umbrella Group is required.  
In order to ensure equal distribution among the wuontich, the Umbrella Group has 
developed a set of rules that regulates distribution of skeletons. The Umbrella Group often 
intervenes and sets prices for the skeletons. There are sanctions of expulsion and fines if these 
rules are violated. 
                                                 
17 Although some regulating bodies can be found in the skeleton industry, this sector can still be termed 
informal. The reason for this is that the people engaged in this industry pay no tax that are officially 
recorded and have no safety net in the form of officially guaranteed insurance and benefits (see Vaa 
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The struggle for control over the prices and the distribution of fish has led to severe 
conflicts in the skeleton industry. During the period of research, the situation was actually 
reduced to open conflict between some of the jawero and the Umbrella Group. The conflict was 
concentrated around a disagreement on the suspension of two jawero. The Umbrella Group 
suspended these jawero because they were suspected of secretly attempting to acquire tenure of 
the land where the skeletons are fried. The suspension implied that the jawero could not 
distribute carcasses to the wuontich, a situation which implied a profit loss for the jawero. 
 The two suspended jawero established their own group, called the Mgongo Wazi Group. 
This group was initiated to curb the legitimacy of the suspension the Umbrella Group had 
effectuated. The conflict over the right to distribute carcasses came to involve agents at all levels 
of work organisation in Obunga. The two rivalling groups mobilised support from the wuontich 
and the workers. As they both had jawero members at the factory, the respective groups would 
only distribute carcasses to their own supporters. The conflict between the two groups eventually 
resulted in physical fighting (see appendix 4).  
The introduction of the Mgongo Wazi Group as a result of the conflict implied that the 
original system of distribution in Obunga was altered. This will be discussed as a dramatic 
contextual change which influenced the way in which the individual wuontich constructed and 
used social capital in Obunga. 
Gender relations 
The majority of the people engaged in the skeleton industry are female. I have introduced a 
perspective of gender-specific social capital. This perspective implies that the construction and use 
of social capital must be seen as influenced by gender structures in the surrounding society. I will 
thus discuss gender structures in Luo society, and outline why I believe the female wuontich in 
Obunga enjoy greater economic liberty than their rural counterparts. The existence of a certain 
gender-bias in the Obunga environment will, however, also be emphasised. This information 
contributes to the understanding how construction and use of social capital is influenced by gender 
structures in this particular environment. 
A study of the economic development in western Kenya has recognised that Luo women 
have lost economic influence in the economic household sphere during the last decades (Francis 
1995). There is a strong tendency among Luo men to consciously limit the women’s decisive 
power in the rural household. Luo women in rural areas often depend on their husbands and sons 
to access economic goods, and they are thus generally deprived of autonomous economic 
influence. Women’s decisive power (teko) is generally limited to questions concerning cooking 
and child-care (Francis 1995). A study of a Luo fishing community on the Tanzanian side of Lake 
Victoria also underscores male authority in decision-making processes outside the household 
(Gerrard 1991). 
There are however spheres where the traditional Luo male authority over women is 
challenged. Many of the women engaged in the carcass industry in Obunga are single women and 
                                                                                                                                               
1991:124). It is nevertheless important to acknowledge that even informal industries are to some extent 
subject to regulations. 
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widows. In the female-headed household, male authority will naturally be limited (Cohen & 
Atieno Odhiambo 1989). Many women operating in the skeleton industry have had to move to 
Obunga in order to create their own economic basis. This gives them larger economic autonomy. 
Many of the wuontich in the carcass industry are women, and they employ men to process 
the skeletons. During interviews, there were few references to problems with female authority 
over male workers. It was widely understood that this was an economic relationship and as long as 
the female wuontich paid the male worker, conflicts would normally not arise.  The wuontich 
Janet sustains this as she says:  
There is no problem being a wuontich over a male worker. He does his work and you pay him. 
The link between women and men in Obunga is money. The female wuontich can tell a man 
what to do. 
Many of the women have managed to become wuontich and they are in this respect 
responsible for their own business. The position of a wuontich can in many ways be conceived as 
position of power, and it is evident that many of these women are highly respected in the field. It 
should nevertheless be noted that even though the position of a wuontich implies power, it is 
nonetheless a vulnerable position. The skeleton industry is subject to rapid changes and most of 
the female wuontich do not have an economic safety net. Many women stand as sole providers for 
their children, and they must in this respect be seen as economically vulnerable. 
It seems as if the women working in the skeleton industry enjoy a certain amount of 
economic freedom. Earlier quoted articles describing gender divisions among the Luo indicate that 
there are often gender inequalities among the Luo (Francis 1995). And indeed, the gender 
divisions are visible in the skeleton industry as well. An example of this is that positions occupied 
by men (e.g. cutting skeletons) are much better paid than positions occupied by women (e.g. 
washing skeletons). This gender inequality reflected in the salary system indicates that the Obunga 
agents operate in an environment organised according to underlying gender values. 
Another example of social organisation according to gender values is that men occupy the 
most lucrative positions in this industry. It is, for example, extremely difficult for a woman to 
become a jawero.  The position of jawero is the position with the highest status and profit 
possibilities. The inability of women to become jawero is yet another sign of a certain gender bias 
in this environment. A relevant question is whether these gender values affect the agents’ abilities 
to construct and use social capital. This topic will be discussed in chapter six where I explore 
whether men and women might have unequal possibilities to construct and use social capital under 
dramatic contextual change. 
Seasonal variations 
The people engaged in the carcass business have a solid understanding of the interrelationship 
between season and profitability. In the rainy season (April-August)18 the market is flooded with 
skeletons and there is a deficit of customers to buy the skeletons. Along with this difficult 
                                                 
18 The seasons are classified in accordance with statements from local informants. It should nevertheless 
be noted that the seasonal variations are subject to change. 
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situation, the rainfall makes it difficult to dry and fry the skeletons. Many people leave the 
business during this season. Peter expresses the impact of the rainy season this way: 
In the rainy season there is rotting fish [skeletons]19 everywhere. I always run away from 
business during that period. 
Both jawero and wuontich struggle to keep their business going during this season. 
The dry season (December-March) on the other hand is commonly referred to as the ‘peak 
season’. Profitability during this season is what gives the carcass industry a reputation for being 
lucrative. During this season there is a great market for the skeletons, and the customers are 
numerous. The amount of fish coming from the factory is low, and the prices are kept very high. 
Both wuontich and jawero make a profit during this period. Competition for supplies is hard 
during this season and the jawero exercise their power in their general control of the distribution 
of the carcasses. The dry season is the ‘season of conflicts’ as many people struggle to remain in 
business.  Generally the wuontich who are able to obtain supplies in this season are the ones who 
have been able to maintain their relationship with the jawero throughout the year. 
The short rainy season (September-November) is, however, the period when most people 
are employed in this business. Prices are at an acceptable level and the supply of skeletons is quite 
stable. In addition, there are customers coming regularly to buy the carcasses. 
Informants thus claim with reason that seasonal variations have a strong impact on their 
business. Input of skeletons, amount of customers and thus profitability change according to 
season. Season should thus be considered a very important backdrop for the skeleton industry, and 
season will accordingly be treated as a dramatic contextual change that severely influences the 
construction and use of social capital in this business. 
THE INFORMAL20 SETTLEMENT OF OBUNGA 
In order to understand the socio-economic status of the majority of the people engaged in the 
carcass industry, it is essential to familiarise oneself with the characteristics of the Obunga area. I 
will present general background information on Obunga, and also discuss merry-go-rounds and 
saving associations as a part of this reality. Migration patterns and family relations will also be 
presented, as these structures will later be discussed as social capital that might facilitate the 
wuontich’ access to resources. 
Obunga is an informal settlement situated within the city boundaries of Kisumu. 
Approximately 20,000 women, men and children live in Obunga. The settlement has schools, a 
medical ward, pharmacies and an orphanage, but many of these facilities do not seem to be 
functioning. There are small enterprises, but the skeleton industry constitutes the largest and most 
organised form of business activity in Obunga. Some of the agents in the skeleton industry have 
additional business activities that they turn to when profitability in skeleton business goes down. 
                                                 
19 Text put in these brackets mark my own explanatory comments. This will be the case for all citations in 
this dissertation 
20 Informal is used to describe the Obunga settlement because it to a large extent remains unregulated by 
the government. The area is by many inhabitants called a ‘slum’. 
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AIDS is rampant in Obunga. In certain age groups, between 30 and 40 percent of the 
population are infected with the HIV virus (Kenya Ministry of Health 1999). The informants 
claim that the high HIV/AIDS prevalence has led to a strain on the micro-level economy in 
Obunga. The inhabitants in the area express that earlier traditions for mutual assistance have 
vanished, and currently everyone has to rely on himself. The former wuontich Mary says: 
A problem is that people are dying more than before. This affects the helping system in that the 
people just start helping themselves. 
Mary seems to indicate that people have difficulties helping each other because the frequency of 
funerals has multiplied during the last years. Expenditures for medical bills pose a serious strain 
on personal economies. This reality constitutes a very pronounced backdrop for the skeleton 
industry in Obunga, and the constant strain on existing networks imposed by high HIV 
prevalence might contribute to the fact that people relate to social networks in a more 
instrumental way. As it becomes impossible to respond to all the economic claims of their social 
networks, one can imagine that people treat bonds as a resource that they might benefit from 
while simultaneously not letting their social networks impose excessive economic claims on 
them. These specific features of social networks in Obunga will constitute a part of the 
subsequent discussion. 
Obunga can be seen as a typical informal settlement with most of the social and economic 
problems often found among urban dwellers in poor countries. Alcoholism, crime, violence and 
health risks are parts of everyday life. A daily, ongoing struggle for income characterises the lives 
of the people who live and work here. This specific reality forms the backdrop for an 
understanding of social capital as a strategic resource for agents operating in this area. 
Informal21 organisations and merry-go-rounds 
Many of the agents in the skeleton industry are organised in small saving associations. Such 
groups will in this dissertation be seen as social networks that can be used as social capital. I will 
later discuss whether shared merry-go-round membership between jawero and wuontich can be 
seen as social capital that can facilitate the wuontich’ access to skeletons. I will therefore present a 
general background on informal saving associations and then outline how these groups are 
organised in Obunga. 
Informal saving associations are common in developing countries where small 
entrepreneurs have difficulties raising money from formal institutions (Granovetter 1995:137). 
Granovetter refers to Geertz when he outlines that the basic principle of such small credit 
associations is that a lump sum is distributed to each and every member at a fixed interval. If there 
are ten members in the saving association who meet once a week, and if the weekly contribution 
from every member is one dollar, then every ten weeks the members will receive ten dollars each 
(Granovetter 1995:137).  
 Ardner emphasises that credit associations will fail unless the members in the group meet 
their obligations. She continues by suggesting that the pressure of public opinion might be enough 
                                                 
21 Again, the term informal is used to describe these organisations because they are rarely subject to 
official regulation and government control. 
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to enforce the members to pay their share to their group. She calls this norm pressure ‘enforceable 
trust’ (Ardner 1964:217). 
  Granovetter acknowledges that some environments are characterised by a lack of 
enforceable trust. In a case from Modjouko in Indonesia, he outlines a setting where a large part of 
the population has migrated from the rural to the urban setting. He underlines that very few of 
these have carried with them persisting ties from the rural environment (Granovetter 1995:131). 
Granovetter explains that in this atomised setting it has been difficult to establish economic 
associations due to the lack of trust and endurable business ties among the agents (Granovetter 
1995:132). 
 A system of credit associations, called merry-go-rounds, is widespread in Obunga. They 
are organised according to the same principles outlined above by Granovetter. These groups meet 
one or two times a week and most often consist of at least ten people. Many of the groups are 
constituted of people with common traits such as common place of origin, similar work etc. The 
contributions are often small and start at 10 Kshs22 up to several hundred shillings a week. There 
has, however, been a tendency for the participants to run away when they have received their 
share of the money. This might be due to lack of ‘enforceable trust’ as Ardner describes it (1964). 
As the Obunga setting is indeed characterised by a large population of immigrants, this might be 
one of the reasons why group pressure is insufficient to secure commitment from the participants. 
Nevertheless, some of the merry-go-rounds function quite well. Granovetter claims that shared 
geographic origin might be a criterion for a sufficient level of trust for the association to function 
(1995). Some of the most successful credit associations in Obunga are based upon place of origin. 
 The majority of the participants in the skeleton industry participate in one or several 
merry-go-rounds. Participation in such groups seems to be a common way of raising additional 
funds. Merry-go-round membership will later be treated as a social affiliation that might be used 
as social capital by the wuontich. The assumption is that in cases where jawero and wuontich 
participate in the same merry-go-round, these social bonds can be used by the wuontich as social 
capital that ensures easier access to skeletons. The discussion of the importance of merry-go-round 
membership as social capital will thus constitute an important part of the subsequent analysis. 
  
Migration and family relations 
 Family is another social network that will later be treated as potential social capital to the 
possessor. The degree to which shared family bonds between jawero and wuontich can be seen as 
a form of social capital that facilitates the wuontich’ access to skeletons will be discussed in 
chapter five. To provide background material for this discussion I now give some basic 
characteristics of family relations in Obunga.  
Obunga is an area characterised by a large population of migrants, of whom many are 
female. Some seem to have come with family members and yet others have arrived alone. Family 
patterns in the rural areas in combination with traditional Luo laws seem to explain why such a 
substantial number of widows and single women migrate to Obunga.  
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Studies of rural-urban migration have acknowledged that women might migrate from 
rural to urban settings as an attempt to escape the subjection experienced in the rural setting. In the 
city the women have more extensive possibilities to be independent from the rural social setting 
(Moser 1993). The quest for freedom and an income seems to be a motivation factor for many of 
the women who choose to migrate to Obunga. Many of them have little family network, and they 
stand as sole providers for their children. Others are barred from returning to their homelands. 
According to Luo customs, the wife belongs to the husband’s family when she marries (Francis 
1995). The husband’s family might chase her from their land. This can happen even though the 
marriage is not dissolved until the wife's family has paid the dowry back (Markussen 2001). In 
cases where the women are chased from the husband's village, they have few possibilities of 
returning to their parent’s land as they formally still belong to the husband’s family. In these 
cases, the women might have few other options than to move to settlements like Obunga in search 
of a livelihood. 
In addition to all the migrants in Obunga there is a group of people who own land in 
Obunga and who have their homesteads in this area. These refer to themselves as ‘Obunga people’ 
and claim authority in the carcass business. Although they represent a minority, they are extremely 
conscious that the carcass industry is situated near an area that belongs to them. The ‘Obunga 
people’ nickname the immigrants ‘Oluwo Reru’ which basically means ‘those who came walking 
along the railway’. This nickname is slightly offensive and refers to the fact that many of the 
people working in the carcass business are immigrants. Normally the division between the 
Obunga people and the ‘Oluwo Reru’ is not stated explicitly, but arguments referring to this 
division seem to be evoked in situations of conflict.  
Few people seem to have family members living in Obunga. There are, however, a few 
families that operate in the skeleton industry, and some of these families stand out as strong and 
united. Family bonds are later discussed as a social capital that might facilitate the wuontich’ 
access to skeletons. The assumption is that the wuontich who share social bonds with a jawero, 
can use these bonds as social capital that ensures easier access to skeletons.   
CONCLUSION 
The central theme in this dissertation is the wuontich’ use of social capital to obtain the Nile perch 
skeletons that she needs to maintain her business activities. The information presented in this 
chapter has provided the necessary background information to be able to conduct this discussion. 
It has been explained that due to the organisational system in Obunga, which ensures the jaweros 
exclusive right to distribute skeletons, the wuontich needs to have personal contact with the 
jawero to access skeletons. As the later discussion will deal with the importance of social capital, 
two important types of social networks, family relations and merry-go-round groups were 
presented. Information on these social networks was necessary because the subsequent discussion 
will ask whether family bonds or merry-go-round membership might be used by the wuontich as a 
form of social capital that might facilitate her access to skeletons.  
                                                                                                                                               
22 1USD =86 Kshs (as pr 14/06/00). 
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 The wuontich’ construction and use of social capital must, however, be put in a broader 
context. To depict the social and economic backdrop for the discussion of the Lake Victoria 
fisheries, the organisation of the skeleton industry and the informal settlement of Obunga were 
presented. This information will to a various extent be referred to in the discussion; some of it will 
simply underlie the discussion in a more subtle way. 
 Certain contextual factors will nevertheless constitute a visible and important part of the 
analysis. In chapter six a discussion of the use of social capital under dramatic contextual change 
will open for a discussion of the flexibility of social capital.  
It will become evident that alterations in the use of social capital also induce alterations in the way 
in which social capital is constructed and used. The information presented in this chapter will thus 
constitute an important backdrop for the understanding of the use social capital as a resource in 
Obunga. 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.     STUDYING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
The basis for all findings presented in this dissertation is the methodological process of studying 
and interpreting the empirical material from Obunga. I will discuss the strategies I have applied 
during fieldwork, and the process of interpreting the empirical findings. These discussions will 
display both the strengths and weaknesses of the methodological approach with a particular focus 
on how I chose to deal with the weaknesses. 
The first part of this chapter describes the process of collecting empirical material about 
social capital in Obunga. This section will present the process of accessing the social reality of 
Obunga during fieldwork. I present how I used interviewing and observation as a means to obtain 
data on the construction and use of social capital in Obunga. Space will be devoted to discussions 
of my own role and how it affected my access to data. Trust, memory and conflict will also be 
discussed as elements that might have influenced the access to certain kinds of data. 
The second part of this chapter will deal with the process of interpreting the empirical 
material on social capital. The organisation and interpretation of the empirical data will be 
discussed and I will present how I attempted to assess the findings in a critical way. The process 
which led me to a focus upon the wuontich will also be recaptured. In addition, I will discuss how 
the key concepts in this dissertation are expressed empirically. Strategies applied to critically 
challenge my own findings during the process of organisation and interpretation will stand as a 
central theme in this discussion. 
METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY 
The main body of the empirical material that constitutes the basis for this dissertation was 
collected through interviews. In total, twenty-five agents operating in the skeleton industry, six 
government officials, two NGO workers and two researchers were interviewed. I actively sought 
to interview informants with different positions within and relations to the skeleton industry. The 
majority of these informants were interviewed because my contacts in the field facilitated my 
association with these individuals. Others were independently chosen on the basis of their position 
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or background.  Material from fifteen of the informants has been used in the discussion.23 Some of 
these informants were interviewed several times. The interviews were semi-structured in the case 
of most Obunga informants.24 In the case of the officials, researchers and also some key-
informants in Obunga, new questions were prepared for every interview. These interviews 
essentially circled around ‘themes’ and had a more explorative character than the semi-structured 
interviews. 
   A research design based upon qualitative interviews can be changed during the process 
of research and it might therefore embrace the multiplicity of reality (Holter 1982:11). This 
flexibility was necessary to embrace the social realities of Obunga.  When I first arrived in 
Obunga, I had a notion that several stable saving associations would offer economic protection to 
the fish-processors in a strained environment. The empirical reality challenged aspects of this 
notion. I found that there were several saving associations, but these were not as stable and well-
functioning as I had presumed. The wuontich Betty was among the informants that indicated that 
the saving groups were not stable associations. She says: 
Often the people run away with their share and the group collapses. 
Other statements indicated that the Obunga agents had an instrumental attitude towards the group. 
They seemed to use the group to obtain a resource and then abandon it, disregarding the threat of 
the normative sanctions that would follow. These findings stressed the level of instrumentality 
among the agents. I realised that I had to include perspectives of how agents used social networks 
for their own benefit. The flexible character of qualitative methodology allowed me to incorporate 
these new perspectives into discussions with the informants. 
  When using qualitative interviews it is, however, important to recognise that the 
researcher will always to some extent influence the answers given. The production of interview-
data takes place during a conversation where the researcher actively takes part. The researcher 
thus influences the information conveyed to her during an interview (Kvale 1997:28). The 
interview technique of the researcher might, however, contribute to the production of rich data in 
that the informant speaks freely about relevant issues. The production of such data is based upon 
the ability of the researcher to guide the informant through the themes without asking leading 
questions (Kvale 1997:95). I attempted not to ask leading questions and to simultaneously be 
sensitive to new topics introduced by the informant. My own influence on the empirical material 
was inevitable, but I consciously attempted to limit the ‘researcher effect’ on the material by being 
sensitive to my own influence and by attempting to let the informants speak freely about the topics 
raised during the interview. 
The use of an interpreter might also have influenced the data I got access to during 
interviews. As most of the female informants in Obunga did not speak English, an interpreter 
translated the questions while I was interviewing. Two factors might have influenced the access 
to data during such interviews. All the information between informant and researcher is 
inevitably ‘filtered’ through the interpreter, and this might influence the content of the data. In 
addition, the interpreter’s presence might influence the flow of information from the informant, 
                                                 
23 These have been given fictitious names and are presented in appendix 2. 
24 The interview guide can be found in appendix 3. 
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in a positive or a negative way, because of the fact that the informant knows the interpreter 
(Berreman 1962:7). As the interpreter I worked with was from Obunga, her presence during 
interviews might have influenced my access to data. In order to deal with this aspect I attempted 
to be sensitive to the potential influence of the interpreter on the material I got access to. In 
addition, I trained the interpreter prior to the interviews in order to ensure that she was informed 
about the processes concerning interpretation of interviews. I attempted to minimise the 
influence that the interpreter and I had on the answers given. It should nevertheless be 
acknowledged that as qualitative interviewing is a dialogue between two or more persons, the 
interviewer will inevitably have some influence on the answers given (Kvale 1997:28).  
Observation also constituted a part of the methodological strategy. As the informants 
knew that I had come to Obunga to write about the skeleton industry, it was accepted that I was 
always writing in my books. I was thus able to jot down the most important aspects of my 
observations. I thus avoided the time lag from observation to logging that is often a problem in 
field research (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:89). Observation data can be used in various ways, 
either to detect new information that the informants do not convey through interviews or to verify 
statements from informants. In the Obunga study, observation was used to do both. Data from 
observation sometimes inspired ideas for new questions to be asked, in other cases observations 
were used to verify that the informants’ explanations corresponded with the actual situation in 
Obunga. An example of the latter situation can be found in my field notes: 
Today in the field I observed that several wuontich were loudly quarrelling. Fiona explained to 
me that one of them had accused another wuontich for having received more skeletons because 
she was the jawero’s cousin (Field notes 15/10/99). 
The observation of this quarrel supported the information earlier given to me by the wuontich 
Betty. She claimed that there were quarrels in the field because the jawero gave priority to family 
members. I saw this as an indication that social capital could ensure easier access to skeletons. My 
observation of the quarrel in the field added weight to this statement and was thus used to 
complement the data collected during interviews. 
The combination of semi-structured and unstructured interviews contributed to a 
flexible methodological design that allowed me to alter the theoretical focus according to the 
empirical findings. Certain elements of the interview situation most probably influenced my 
access to data, but I attempted to deal with these challenges by being sensitive towards my own 
and the interpreter’s influence on the material.  Data from observation will supplement the 
interview data where available, but due to the character of the Obunga setting,25 observational 
data constitutes a limited part of the empirical material constituting the basis for analysis. 
MY ROLE 
The information that the informants choose to convey to the researcher will inevitably be 
influenced by whom they perceive the researcher to be. I will discuss aspects of my influence on 
the information that I had access to in Obunga. Discussions of my  
                                                 
25 The informal fish-processing area is characterised by high activity, thick smoke and boiling fish-fat. It 
is thus difficult to spend time and to make observations in this field. 
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affiliation with a well-known NGO, my age, gender and status as a student will be discussed as 
potential influences on the material collected in Obunga. 
  My affiliation with an NGO might have influenced the information that the informants 
chose to convey to me. The Obunga case was presented to me by a senior researcher who had 
been working with questions related to the Lake Victoria fisheries for several years. The contact 
with the senior researcher and the NGO he worked for ensured easy access to the skeleton 
industry in Obunga. I was introduced to important ‘gatekeepers’ and was simultaneously given 
legitimacy by my affiliation with the NGO. The affiliation with this NGO may simultaneously 
have implied that I was blocked from certain information. Hammersley and Atkinson underline 
that  ‘sponsors’ who provide legitimacy for the researcher can be important for access to the field 
of research (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:89). They simultaneously emphasise that such 
sponsors might have a limiting affect on access to data. The most well intended sponsor might 
influence the content of the fieldwork because the researcher is continuously associated with this 
person (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:103).   
  I tried to influence my own role in the field by emphasising that I was a student and 
that I was not performing any assessment for development projects. Many of the informants still 
seemed to associate me with the NGO of the senior researcher who had introduced me to the 
field. I discovered this by the fact that some of the informants seemed to underplay the problems 
and conflicts in the field in fear of loosing potential development assistance. An excerpt from 
my field notes explains how this was expressed during an interview with the wuontich Jason: 
He kept on denying the importance of the conflict between the Mgongo Wazi Group and the 
Umbrella Group. He told me after the interview that he was worried that I would present a bad 
picture of Obunga because of the current problems. I got a feeling that he was trying to 
underestimate some of the problems in the field because he is afraid that NGOs will not help 
Obunga if they know about all the problems (Field notes 19/11-99). 
The affiliation with the NGO might have influenced the answers given to me by the informants. 
Hammersley and Atkinson emphasise that informants will inevitably attempt to place the 
researchers in roles that they know (1996:109). Considering the sponsorship by the NGO and my 
colour of skin, it is probable that I was placed in the well known role of ‘donor’26. Although I 
attempted to present myself as a student, this seemed to be an unfamiliar category to the 
informants. I found it hard to escape the established perceptions of Europeans as donors, but 
attempted to compensate by deliberately using local terms and references to distinguish myself 
from other NGO workers visiting the field for short periods. I attempted to display that I was 
different by staying for a long period of time and greeting the skeleton dealers in the local 
language. Such ‘impression strategy’ might be a way to compensate for ascribed roles in the field 
of research (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996:112). The emphasis on displaying my interest in the 
local language and culture might to some extent have bridged the gap created by my 
incomprehensible role as something between a student and a donor. This was probably more so 
the case for the people who got to know me well over a long period of time. 
                                                 
26 The Obunga informants have several times experienced that Europeans come to the field for a short 
period to assess the opportunity for development projects in this area. 
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 My age and gender most likely influenced the way that the informants perceived me. 
Local cultural perceptions of my age and gender in combination with my eagerness to present 
myself as a student might have contributed to making my role quite incomprehensible. I was too 
old to be a regular student, and women my age normally should be preoccupied with the home and 
children. My status as married but childless just added to the fact that the informants did not 
understand my role. Notes from my field diary explain this: 
Today I was presented to the skeleton fryers by one of the leaders in the Umbrella Group. He 
explained that I was a student doing research for the university. One woman wondered if I was 
married and whether I had any children. The leader asked me and I said no. When confronted 
with these facts the women started laughing. I got a feeling that they did not understand how a 
married woman my age could not have children. I also assume that they see me as a fairly ‘old’ 
student despite my 26 years of age (Fieldnotes 15/9-99). 
Solberg highlights the importance of taking a role that is known to the informants to obtain 
access to the field (1982:129). My intention to present myself as a student might not have 
facilitated access to data considering my age and gender. Many of the informants simply did not 
seem to recognise my role and I thus became incomprehensible to them. This might have 
limited my access to data. My deliberate attempts to display myself as a person who was 
different from other NGO workers, in combination with my repeated visits to the field seemed, 
however, to have contributed to the fact that the informants to some extent got used to my 
presence and chose to share information about their own situation with me. 
MEMORY AND CONFLICT AS INFLUENCING ACCESS TO DATA 
I will discuss how certain kinds of data proved difficult to access during fieldwork. The discussion 
will circle around how data about change is more easily accessed than data about more underlying 
features of sociality. I emphasise that when dealing with data about change it is important to be 
aware that retrospective data about ‘before’ as opposed to ‘now’ have several potential 
weaknesses. The eruption of a conflict in Obunga will be discussed as a factor that produced new 
valuable knowledge of social capital. I will also highlight that the eruption of conflict might have 
limited my access to data to some extent because I found it difficult to maintain my contacts with 
both the conflicting parties. 
 This dissertation introduces an understanding of dramatic contextual change as 
influencing the organisation of the skeleton industry and thus the construction and use of social 
capital among the wuontich. This understanding will constitute the basis for the discussion of the 
flexibility of social capital. Data about dramatic contextual change is not always easy to obtain. As 
some of the contextual changes I will discuss, such as declining supplies, are dramatic yet subtle, 
it proved difficult to get the informants to reflect upon these changes. Other dramatic contextual 
changes, such as seasonal variations, are more overt and thus easier to obtain information about. 
For information on dramatic contextual change I had to rely almost exclusively on the informants’ 
memories of these changes. 
 Repstad underlines that retrospective data based on memory are not always trustworthy 
(1993:71). He also stresses that people often remember palpable events and changes better than 
altered feelings and emotions. I tried to apply this insight during interviews as I obtained 
information of dramatic contextual change by asking about more palpable changes in the skeleton 
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industry. An example of this is that I asked whether the informants knew anyone who had left the 
skeleton industry, and I asked about their reflections on why these people had to leave. By asking 
about the stories of specific people who had left the skeleton industry, I collected information on 
how a dramatic contextual change like declining supplies can force people to abandon their 
business in the skeleton industry. The strategy of asking for palpable changes gave access to 
changes that might be subtle but that still had an immense effect on the skeleton industry. 
 The eruption of conflict provided access to rich data on how dramatic contextual change 
affects the construction and use of social capital. During the period of fieldwork the Mgongo Wazi 
Group broke out and started an alternative distribution network. This provided valuable insight to 
discussions of the strategic construction of social capital and the effect of dramatic contextual 
change on the construction and use of social capital. On the other hand, the conflict might have 
decreased the opportunity to obtain certain kinds of data. The reason for this is that I was 
commonly associated with the leaders in the Umbrella Group. When I first entered Obunga the 
Mgongo Wazi Group did not exist and there was consequently no conflict between the two 
groups. I thus found it natural to enter the field through contacts that I had in the Umbrella Group 
leadership. One of the women in this group became a close friend and I often ate at her house 
when visiting Obunga. When the conflict broke out I struggled to make contacts on the other side 
of the conflict in order to access views from all the parties in the conflict. Peter, a wuontich in the 
splinter group, became my strongest contact on the rivalling side of the conflict. Despite this, there 
were still indications that people associated me with the Umbrella Group. The last week before I 
left I was put in an impossible situation because of the conflict. I had planned to arrange a farewell 
party in a house belonging to an Umbrella Group official. Notes from my field diary explain my 
dilemma: 
The farewell party at Sara's house with all my informants and Peter from the Mgongo Wazi 
Group seems to be hanging in thin air. Last night Fiona came and told me that the groups had 
started fighting. The Mgongo Wazi Group had allegedly attacked the Umbrella Group 
members during a meeting, using sticks and stones. The Mgongo Wazi Group people ran to the 
police and now eleven people from the Umbrella Group are being held in prison. Peter has run 
away from Obunga. It is horrible. I have no idea what to do. It seems impossible to have a 
party in a house owned by an Umbrella Group member in this situation. It would be like 
celebrating a victory over the Mgongo Wazi Group  (Fieldnotes 4/12-99) (See also appendix 
4). 
I chose to not participate in the party but to let the others eat and drink the food that was prepared 
for the guests. My affiliation with prominent members of the Umbrella Group made it impossible 
to present myself as neutral. This is closely linked to the findings I made in Obunga. During this 
period, group affiliation was a prime criterion to obtain skeletons. Everyone in the field knew to 
which group the other belonged. The division made it impossible to stand between groups as the 
Obunga agents seemed to categorise each other according to group affiliation. This reality in 
combination with my contacts with the Umbrella Group made it impossible to be perceived as 
neutral. Despite my efforts I was most probably seen as closely affiliated with the Umbrella Group 
leaders.  
My affiliation with the Umbrella Group probably affected the information conveyed to 
me by informants. Green reports the very same dilemma from her fieldwork during a strike. She 
became associated with one of the parties in the conflict and her access to information from the 
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opposing party was restricted (Green 1993:105). Most likely, the material underlying the 
discussions in this dissertation is biased because of this.  In retrospect, one might say that contact 
with the Umbrella Group influenced the access to empirical material in several ways. In some 
ways it ensured an easy access to the field, but during the conflict contact with the Umbrella 
Group most likely contributed to limiting my access to data from the opposing Mgongo Wazi 
Group. 
 The discussion has emphasised that several mechanisms influence the access to data 
during the process of fieldwork. The role of the researcher might affect the information that the 
informants choose to convey to her. I also outlined how memory and conflict are factors that 
influence access to data. This discussion has outlined the specific features that I felt influenced my 
access to data. A continuous reflexivity towards the factors that influence access to data has been 
outlined as a central part of my strategies to deal with the challenges of accessing the social reality 
of Obunga. I now move on to discuss the organisation and interpretation of the empirical data 
from Obunga. 
STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING MY OWN FINDINGS  
Through the process of fieldwork and analysis I came to focus upon the wuontich’ use of social 
capital to obtain a resource. In chapter five I will explain why I came to choose this particular 
perspective in an analysis of social capital in Obunga. In the present chapter I will merely explain 
how I attempted to continuously challenge my own findings in a critical way.  
Social capital was a concept I brought with me into the field and it was therefore 
important to challenge this concept through the analysis. The use of negative cases and the 
weighing of interviews have been the main strategies that I have applied to ensure reflexivity in 
the process of interpreting the empirical material. 
 To uphold a critical distance to the analytical categories applied in the discussion I used 
an approach where I consistently looked for ‘negative cases’ that would challenge my own 
assumptions. The analysis will show that I discuss these negative cases where available. Miles and 
Huberman emphasise that looking for negative evidence is one way of confirming findings 
(1984:241).  
 The idea of the instrumental construction and use of social capital among the Obunga 
wuontich was also challenged by weighing the data. Again, Miles and Huberman provide an 
important tactic for testing findings. They say that the weighing of data might ensure that only 
material of high quality is included in the analysis (1984:236) During fieldwork, the interviews 
were given points from zero to four according to certain criteria.27 Only interviews graded two 
points or more will underlie the analysis. The use of a tape recorder was given one as opposed to 
zero points because this conveys rich and detailed data. Lack of disturbance, by for example 
interruption during the interview, was awarded with one point. Interviews conducted without the 
interpreter were also given one point, as the information was not ‘filtered’ on its way from the 
informant to the researcher. Feeling of good communication is the last criterion and was rewarded 
with one point. Good communication was characterised by a continuous flow of conversation. 
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Weighing according to these criteria resulted in the fact that only thirty-four of a total of seventy-
five interviews have been used as a basis for the discussion.  
 All these criteria might be discussed as potentially negative or positive to the interview 
situation. An obvious argument against the use of such criteria is that they are set according to 
subjective evaluations of the interview situation. One might also argue that this grading of 
interviews is somewhat reductive in that it does not embrace the full complexity of the reality 
surrounding the interview situation. Another critique might be that the women interviewed with 
interpreter and without the tape recorder in Obunga were at a maximum given two points for lack 
of disturbance and good communication. The use of a Dholuo-English interpreter was often a 
necessity in Obunga where very few female informants spoke English.28 To compensate for this I 
have chosen to put as much emphasise on interviews given two points as interviews given four 
points.   
 Despite the discussions surrounding these criteria, I argue that ‘grading’ is a useful way of 
weighing the evidence.29 This might be an important precondition for a good and thorough 
analysis of the empirical material. 
 The discussion has showed that several tactics have been applied to challenge the 
theoretical concept of the instrumental use of social capital in relation to the empirical findings. 
These strategies have contributed to upholding an important critical distance to the empirical 
findings. 
THE EMPIRICAL EXPRESSIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTRUMENTALITY 
Establishing empirical expressions of the theoretical concepts is a challenge that must be dealt 
with adequately. A reoccurring problem in qualitative analysis is that the observable data do not 
correspond exactly with the theoretical concepts (Phelan & Reynolds 1996:115). I will address 
this problem in relation to two of the most important terms in this discussion, namely, social 
capital and instrumentality. 
 During fieldwork I did not have a precise understanding of the empirical expressions of 
social capital, but I interviewed wuontich in depth about their social relations with the jawero, and 
what they perceived to be the prime criteria for access to skeletons. While interpreting the 
empirical material I realised that I needed a more narrow definition in order to distinguish social 
capital from ordinary business relations. The richness of the data allowed me to define social 
capital in a more precise manner. I was inspired by Bourdieu's explanation of social capital where 
he emphasises that membership in a group or a network provides the members with a ‘credential’ 
that facilitates the canalisation of resources through social relations (Bourdieu 1986:249). I thus 
started to look for the importance of merry-go-round membership and family bonds as two 
empirical examples of network associations that would stand as a guarantor for the flow of 
resources between members of this same group in a business setting. Later, the Mgongo Wazi 
                                                                                                                                               
27 This methodology is also described by Hunt, Wilder and Wahlke 1964. See also appendix 2 
28 Many of the female Obunga inhabitants seem to lack formal schooling. They use Dholuo as their 
primary language. 
29 Having reviewed these interviews I have verified that the rejected interviews did not contain any 
systematic information of value to the analysis. 
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Group will also be included as a network that has potential value as social capital. The empirical 
expression of social capital in Obunga is shared group membership between a wuontich and a 
jawero who interact as business partners in Obunga. Family bonds and merry-go-round 
membership have been mentioned as examples of such networks. The discussion will explore the 
extent to which shared membership in a network between wuontich and jawero is significant for 
the flow of resources through their relationship, and thereby constitutes social capital to the 
wuontich. An important aspect of the operationalisation of the term is that these bonds only 
constitute potential social capital to the agent. It is when resources are mobilised through these 
bonds that the social relation constitutes social capital. The main theme of the discussion will be 
the mechanisms that influence mobilisation of resources through these social bonds. 
 Instrumental construction and use of social capital constitute integral parts of the analytic 
discussion. This poses a challenge, as data on the informants' motivations for action is relatively 
inaccessible. During interviews it proved challenging to encourage the informants to reflect upon 
motivations for the choices they made. The data obtained referred more to concrete action and 
praxis than to motivations for these actions. A present danger is that I might interpret the action as 
instrumental while the agent herself has got a whole range of motivations for making that exact 
choice. Barth discusses the inaccessibility of the informants' motivations for action in his analysis 
of a Balinese society (1993:159). He claims that by spending time with the informants in their 
social universe, it becomes possible to make intelligent guesses about their motivations for action 
(1993:160). As I conducted a broad range of interviews and spent considerable time in Obunga, I 
should be equipped with some knowledge about the social and economic reality of the informants. 
This might, according to Barth facilitate my interpretations of the wuontich' motivations for 
action. It is nevertheless important to understand that data about instrumentality are subtle. 
Motivations for action are rarely stated explicitly. The interpretation of actions as instrumental 
should thus be perceived as associated with a certain level of uncertainty. This insight will 
underlie the subsequent interpretation of the instrumental use of social capital among the Obunga 
wuontich.  
THE CASE STUDY 
A case study represents a bounded context in which one studies events, processes and outcomes 
(Miles and Huberman 1984:28). Although the Obunga study describes such a bounded context it 
is nevertheless my intention to use the Obunga findings in a more general debate on social capital 
in the urban informal setting. Lofland claims that one of the criteria for generalisation from a case 
study is the use of a generic analytical framework. I have attempted to engage in a dialogue with 
major theoretical contributions on social capital. This has enabled me to relate my findings to the 
larger debate on social capital. The establishment of findings has been generated in a continuous 
dialogue with major theorists. It has thus become possible to ‘lift’ the findings from the Obunga 
study up to a higher level and relate them to more general debates on social capital in the urban 
informal sector. 
 Another prerequisite for the generalisation of the findings in a case study is the validity of 
the data collection the analysis. This chapter represents an attempt to display a critical and 
reflexive attitude to the process of collecting and analysing the empirical material from Obunga. 
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This critical attitude is, according to Kvale, a prerequisite for the validity and thus the generic 
value of the findings (1997:168). The discussion has shown that I have reflected on my own role 
and my influence on the informants in the field. It also demonstrates that I have attempted to 
criticise my own findings and theoretical assumptions during the process of analysing the material. 
These are all factors that contribute to increasing the validity of the data and thus form a basis for 
the generalisation of the findings from the Obunga case study. 
 The critical discussion of the methodology and analysis in combination with the dialogue 
with major theoretical contributions will stand as arguments in favour of the contribution of the 
Obunga findings to the larger debate on social capital in the urban informal sector. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the process of collecting and analysing material describing construction 
and use of social capital in Obunga. The strengths and weaknesses of using in-depth interviews 
and observation as methodological strategy has been described. I have also explained how certain 
factors, like my own role and the subtle character of certain data might have influenced my access 
to data on the wuontich’ use of social capital in Obunga.  
 The second part of the chapter dealt with the process of interpreting data on social capital. 
My efforts to uphold a critical distance to my own concepts have been described. I have also 
outlined that the weighing of interviews and the use of negative examples have been the two main 
strategies that I have applied to challenge my own assumptions and concepts. The weighing of 
interviews will underlie the coming discussions in a subtle way. The use of negative cases as a 
strategy will become visible through the debates in the next two chapters, as I continuously 
attempt to challenge my findings by providing contradictory examples. This will enhance a critical 
debate of the findings. 
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5.  THE VALUE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will attempt to assess the value of social capital to the Obunga wuontich30. This 
will be done by discussing different aspects of how social capital is constructed and used in 
Obunga. Social capital will in this discussion be understood as network-based social bonds 
between jawero and wuontich that facilitate the wuontich’ access to skeletons. 
 The discussion will address whether the wuontich perceive social capital as a valuable 
resource that facilitates their access to skeletons. Statements from the informants are used to 
establish the types of bonds that might constitute social capital in this environment. The limiting 
capacity social capital will also be discussed. This limiting capacity will be expressed as pressure 
towards group-oriented behaviour. I will explore whether the agents see themselves as being 
under such pressure from the social groups that might constitute social capital. These debates will 
provide knowledge of the possibilities and limitations for the use of social capital in Obunga. This 
information will give indications of the value of social capital to the Obunga wuontich. 
   In chapter two, I outlined that a conception of instrumental agents constructing and using 
social capital to obtain resources would be applied in the analysis. I will debate whether this 
theoretical assumption is applicable to the Obunga setting. This debate will also provide 
information on the value of social capital as any potential instrumental use of such probably 
increases its value as a resource in this setting. 
  The discussion will start with an overview of how I came to reflect upon social capital as 
an important resource to the wuontich. I then move on to debate whether the wuontich themselves 
see social capital as a valuable resource that facilitates their access to skeletons. This debate will 
be followed by a discussion of the potentially limiting capacity of social capital. I then discuss 
whether the wuontich construct and use social capital instrumentally in this environment before I 
sum up the main findings from the preceding discussion. 
                                                 
30 Unless otherwise stated, the discussion in this chapter deals with the value of social capital to the 
wuontich during the dry season. The next chapter will discuss the seasonal impact on the construction and 
use of social capital. 
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UNDERSTANDING THE WUONTICH’ BUSINESS STRATEGIES 
Social capital has been outlined as the analytical tool that will be used to understand the business 
strategies of the Obunga wuontich. I will attempt to recapitulate the empirical findings that 
allowed me to start reflecting upon social capital as an appropriate key to the understanding of 
how the wuontich manage to keep their businesses running. 
 Theoretical writings on work organisations in informal settlements had prepared me for 
the importance of social capital to the survival of the Obunga wuontich’ businesses (Portes 1995, 
Tvedten & Nangulah 1999). Specific research on Kenyan society also suggested traditions of 
strong informal networks in more formalised work structures (Macoloo 1988, Seierup 1994). 
 It was nevertheless ongoing quarrels and conflicts that brought my attention to the 
importance of social relations in the skeleton business. When I first arrived in the field there was 
shortage of supplies, and I was informed that many people were dissatisfied with the way the 
skeletons were distributed. The distribution was supposed to be conducted according to formalised 
lists, but many wuontich complained that the jawero gave priority to wuontich with whom they 
had special affiliation. This seemed like an indication that the skeletons were still distributed 
according to personal contacts rather than according to a formalised system. 
Disagreements on the distribution of fish evolved into a conflict between the Umbrella 
Group and some of the jawero. Actions taken during this conflict and the language used by the 
involved parties further sustained my assumption of social alliances as a resource in the skeleton 
business. A main motivation for the two parties seemed to be mobilisation of people in their quest 
for power. This strengthened the notion I had of social networks as a resource in Obunga. 
Other factors also indicated social bonds as a potential resource to the people employed in 
the skeleton industry. All business relations, between wuontich and jawero and between wuontich 
and worker alike, were conducted by people in personal interaction. Several statements from the 
informants revealed that social bonds, like membership in a saving group or family relations, 
could be mobilised for business purposes. This praxis suggested that the key to business success 
might lie in the content and quality of these interactions. The assumption of social capital as an 
important asset in the skeleton business thus evolved. 
The detection of social relations as an important part of the wuontich’ business strategies 
was, however, only a very first step towards a deeper understanding of the nature of social capital. 
The aspects of social relations that constitute them as capital to the possessors need to be 
discussed and explored in depth in order to capture the complexity of social capital. What is the 
nature of these relations? To what extent do my theoretically informed expectations reflect the 
empirical situation in Obunga? These questions will be raised in my attempt to understand the 
value of social capital to the Obunga wuontich. 
PERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
This discussion will deal with social bonds as a potential asset in the wuontich' struggle to obtain 
skeletons. I will discuss whether the wuontich perceive the jawero to give priority to wuontich to 
whom they have social affiliation when the skeletons are distributed. The discussion will show 
that there are diverging opinions on whether social capital actually facilitates access to skeletons 
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or not.  In addition, I will attempt to pin down the degree to which social bonds only constitute 
social capital to the wuontich under certain conditions. My focus is laid on the Obunga agents' 
own perceptions of social capital as a valuable asset in this industry. The empirical expressions of 
social bonds that potentially constitute capital to the wuontich will become evident as the 
informants themselves express what they perceive to be the types of social affiliation that facilitate 
access to skeletons. 
Do social bonds between wuontich and jawero matter when the skeletons are distributed 
in Obunga? Former wuontich Janet seems to indicate that the jawero favour some of the wuontich. 
She expresses: 
The fish is not equally distributed. The jawero have their customers to whom they give 
priority. 
The citation indicates that certain underlying mechanisms in the relationship between the jawero 
and the wuontich incline the jawero to give priority to some of the wuontich. The question is 
whether it is already established social bonds or other factors that motivate the jawero to give 
priority to certain wuontich. The wuontich John seems to indicate that  it is already existing social 
bonds between jawero and wuontich that will ensure that the wuontich gets priority when the fish 
skeletons are distributed: 
The jawero are biased. They distribute according to relations. 
John says that relations matter when the fish is distributed.  But how are these relations expressed 
empirically? What relations do the Obunga wuontich themselves feel give priority to skeletons? 
Citations from Frank might bring us closer to the answer. Frank is a successful jawero and he 
describes the specific social bonds that matter when he distributes the skeletons: 
The fish is not equally distributed; the jawero have their customers to whom they give priority. 
It is an advantage to be in the family or the merry-go-round of a jawero. 
Frank states that the wuontich, who have family bonds31 or shared group membership32 with the 
jawero, may be given priority when the skeletons are distributed. 
 The former wuontich Mary seems to sustain John’s perception of this as she explains how 
one of the smaller jawero, Peter, prioritises when he distributes the skeletons: 
 The jawero will give his family first. Like Peter, he always gives to his mom first.  
Peter himself admits that he gives priority to his family first when questioned about issue. 
These findings are a strong indication that social bonds between wuontich and jawero 
facilitate the wuontich’ access to skeletons. Family bonds and shared membership in a saving – 
                                                 
31 I will not attempt to make a further specification of what relations ‘family bonds’ denote. The 
significant finding is that the wuontich themselves perceive family bonds to ensure easier access to 
skeletons 
32 Not all wuontich are fortunate enough to be a member of the same merry-go-round as the jawero. The 
reason for this is that earlier established merry-go-rounds might be difficult to enter for the wuontich. In 
addition, some of these groups are constituted by people who have migrated from the same area. Such 
groups seem to be inaccessible for wuontich migrating from other areas. 
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group have been mentioned as examples of social bonds that facilitate this access. These findings 
sustain the assumption that social capital is indeed a valuable asset for the Obunga wuontich in the 
struggle to obtain fish skeletons. Social networks, manifested in family relations and shared 
merry-go-round membership, clearly represent social bonds through which resources might be 
mobilised in Obunga. 
There are, however, diverging opinions on this issue. Some informants seem to indicate 
that personal affiliation has less significance when the skeletons are distributed. The wuontich Eve 
sees the distribution of skeletons as a mere business transaction between the jawero and the 
wuontich: 
The jawero just gives you fish as a businessperson. If you don’t get today you will get 
tomorrow. 
The statement indicates that the skeletons are distributed according to a formalised business 
relationship between the wuontich and the jawero. In this view, established social bonds are less 
important factors when it comes to the distribution of the skeletons. This finding probably 
decreases the value of social capital to the wuontich. Many of the informants in Obunga share this 
view. This finding represents a counter-argument to the assumption of family bonds and merry-
go-round affiliation as social capital to the wuontich. I will argue that the earlier cited statements 
on quarrels over unequal distribution of skeletons, and the priority given to family members and 
merry-go-round associates suggest a reading of social bonds as valuable social capital ensuring 
easier access to skeletons. 
 Family bonds and merry-go-round membership have been mentioned as social bonds that 
might constitute social capital to the Obunga wuontich. In order to achieve a thorough 
understanding of this issue I will now present arguments against viewing family bonds as 
important social capital in this area. This discussion underscores that as there are few family bonds 
in Obunga, such bonds do not constitute important social capital to the wuontich. Several 
informants claim that family bonds have been broken, as many people have migrated from rural 
areas to Obunga in search for a livelihood. Nelly, a District Social Development Officer engaged 
in Obunga issues, puts it this way: 
The family is supposed to be the first helper in case of problems. A problem with rural-urban 
migration is that family bonds dissolve. Everyone is trying to find a livelihood for him or 
herself. The old ones are left at home (…) with the high AIDS related death rates the bonds get 
strained and they get weaker. 
The wuontich John seems to sustain this as he says: 
Family relations are not so common in the skeleton business. 
These citations point to the same issue from different angles. Nelly depicts socio-structural 
characteristics of Obunga that explain the relative absence of family bonds in Obunga, while John 
experiences the exact same reality at a very local level. These citations indicate that family bonds 
should not be overrated as social capital to the Obunga wuontich, due to the fact that very many of 
them do not possess these social bonds with the jawero. Nelly also points to the fact that family 
bonds, to the extent that they exist, might be strained and weak due to severe economic pressure. 
Observations from Obunga, combined with citations from informants still indicate that 
family relations, to the extent that they exist, matter and constitute social capital to the wuontich 
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when the skeletons are distributed. The strongest indication of this is complaints from many of the 
wuontich that the jawero do not distribute the skeletons equally, and that they give priority to their 
family and saving group associates. Excerpts from my field notes explain the situation: 
There are complaints among the members in the Umbrella Group that the fish is not distributed 
equally, they have had meetings where this was discussed. The wuontich say that the jawero 
give skeletons to their family and merry-go-round members, and that those without such 
connections are disfavoured (Field notes 03/10-99). 
The wuontich Betty sustains this observation as she explains: 
When there is little fish the jawero look for their merry-go-round friends and family first: many 
people don’t get. There are quarrels over this because of the discrimination. 
The clearly voiced complaints from some of the wuontich over unequal distribution of skeletons 
taken together with strong signs of disagreements among the informants, sustain the argument that 
the jawero gives priority to the wuontich with whom he shares social bonds. The quarrels that 
Betty refers to might sustain the previous observation that many of the wuontich indeed have no 
family bonds with the jawero. But Betty simultaneously points out that to the extent that family 
bonds exist they can be seen as social capital to the wuontich. As many of the wuontich lack such 
bonds, the injustice of family members being given priority might exacerbate the quarrels and 
complaints.  
 The significance of family bonds as social capital has been discussed and merry-go-round 
membership has been mentioned as a social bond that might constitute social capital. I will now 
move on to discuss the significance of both these types of social relations. Betty’s citation 
mentions both merry-go-round affiliation and family affiliation as facilitating access to skeletons. 
It is, however, worth noting one particular aspect of what Betty expresses in the above citation. 
She claims that the jawero give priority to their family and friends when ‘fish is little’. Low 
supplies of fish naturally lead to stronger competition over resources. Could it be that family 
bonds and merry-go-round membership are more valuable as social capital in periods of low 
supply than in times of abundance? 
 Many empirical findings point in this direction, especially because the informants, 
without exception, say that during times of abundant supplies, e.g. in the rainy season, the jawero 
have difficulties disposing of the skeletons. The wuontich do not want to process high numbers of 
skeletons because the prices are low and the customers few. The specific impact of variations in 
supplies on the construction and use of social capital will be discussed in the next chapter. In this 
chapter I merely indicate that the value of social bonds between wuontich and jawero seems to be 
considerably higher in times of low supplies. The findings indicate that level of supply might 
influence the value of social capital to the Obunga wuontich. The informants also mention one 
other factor that might affect the way resources are mobilised through the social network. Mary 
reveals that the wuontich might have to fulfil certain criteria in order to convert her social bonds 
into social capital. Referring to a wuontich’ situation she says: 
Being in the same merry-go-round as the jawero can be important but the most important thing 
is that you pay regularly to the jawero. 
Mary identifies payment rather than social affiliation as the most important dimension of the 
jawero-wuontich business relation. She continues by saying that economic capital might be the 
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most important factor considered when the skeletons are distributed even between family 
members: 
With wuontich and jawero it is the payment that counts, the jawero will not give to his cousin 
if she does not pay. 
These citations indicate that the assumption of social bonds as a strategic asset for the wuontich is 
only valid if other criteria, like prompt payment for the skeletons, are effectuated. Mary continues: 
In this business money talks. So many people depend so much on this money. In this business 
money is number one and relations are number two. When it comes to blood relations, money 
might well be number two. 
Mary’s citations indicate that family and merry-go-round relations can only be used as social 
capital when the economic capital flows between wuontich and jawero. This statement is also 
sustained by other informants. Input of economic capital might be needed to realise the full 
potential of social bonds as social capital. In her first citation she states that even the cousin has to 
pay, but she later makes an exception for what she calls ‘blood relations’ which might denote the 
closest family members. For other people with whom the jawero shares social bonds and for 
people not in close family with the jawero, payment seems to be a requirement for social bonds to 
constitute social capital. 
 In order to achieve a full understanding of the value of social capital to the wuontich, it 
might be interesting to explore what agents with no social capital in the form of social bonds with 
the jawero do to obtain skeletons. It actually seems as if the main strategy to obtain skeletons of 
the wuontich who has no social bonds with the jawero is prompt payment and a good business 
relation with the jawero.  Peter says that if you do not know the jawero it is of particular 
importance to work hard and to pay the jawero in advance: 
If you do not know the jawero it is important to be seen as reliable and to get many customers. 
These good business women are often the young ones. They can afford to pay many jawero in 
advance and they therefore get a lot of fish, capital and customers. 
It seems to be particularly important to do business well and to give an impression of reliability if 
the agent does not share social bonds with the jawero. This might be a strategy to create a 
relationship of confidence that will ensure access to skeletons. On the other hand, reliability and 
advance payment seem to be an important criterion to obtain skeletons even for the wuontich who 
share social bonds with the jawero.  The deduction from this might be that as the informants claim 
that it is an advantage to share social bonds with the jawero, social capital seems to enhance 
access to skeletons. It nevertheless seems to be important for all the wuontich, with or without 
social capital, to maintain good business relations with the jawero in order to obtain skeletons 
from him. 
 The empirical findings as a whole seem to sustain the assumption that social capital is a 
valuable resource to the wuontich in Obunga. The informants themselves have mentioned that 
family bonds and shared saving group membership between wuontich and jawero increase the 
wuontich’ access to skeletons. The transmission of resources according to such bonds can be seen 
as social capital as it represents social relations which enhance economic profitability in a given 
context. Family bonds and merry-go-round membership will necessarily have different qualities as 
social capital, as they represent different types of social bonds. Some of these differences will 
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hopefully emerge as they are discussed separately as bonds that might impose a limitation on the 
wuontich' scope of action.  
 The discussion has nevertheless shown that the assumption of social capital as a valuable 
asset to the wuontich needs some modification. It seems as if certain criteria must be present in 
order to fully utilise social capital as a valuable asset. A very important finding is that economic 
capital seems to be a criterion for social bonds to be converted into social capital. This view was 
not incorporated in the theoretical framework for the sheer reason that this issue is not much 
present in social capital theories. Social capital is commonly viewed as a form of capital prevalent 
among the poor because they lack other forms of capital (World Bank homepage 2001). The 
findings from Obunga underline, however, that input of economic capital seems to be a criterion 
for social bonds to function as a strategic asset to the wuontich. This has implications for 
theoretical reflections on poverty and social capital. The very poor might not possess the 
economic means required to realise the full potential of social capital. The view of social capital as 
a non-monetary from of capital among the poor thus needs modification.  
 The need for the input of economic capital to realise the full potential of social capital can 
also be seen as affecting the value of social capital to the wuontich. This resource is not readily 
usable but needs economic incentives to facilitate access to skeletons. The expenses associated 
with the use of social capital might imply that the value of this resource decreases to some extent.  
SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A LIMITATION 
This discussion will address the limiting effect social bonds might have on the Obunga wuontich. 
It has been emphasised that social bonds under certain circumstances can represent valuable assets 
to the wuontich in Obunga. The theoretical framework of this dissertation points out, however, 
that social capital can also be a hindrance to the agent’s scope of action. It was emphasised that 
possession of social bonds might impose limitations in the form of pressure towards group-
oriented behaviour.33 This aspect of social capital will be discussed with specific reference to the 
potentially limiting impact of merry-go-round membership and family bonds on the Obunga 
wuontich. These relations will be dealt with separately. I will also discuss whether the potentially 
limiting capacity of social capital might have an affect on the value of this resource to the Obunga 
wuontich.  
 It was previously stated that the jawero might distribute fish skeletons in favour of the 
wuontich with membership in the same saving group as them. Membership in a merry-go-round 
might thus represent social capital to the wuontich. On the other hand, merry-go-round 
membership can imply restrictions on the wuontich' business activities in the form of pressure 
towards group-oriented behaviour. Membership in a merry-go-round might imply that the 
participant’s personal economy is closely scrutinised by the other members in the group to 
ensure that the member fulfils her economic obligations towards the group. The wuontich Eve 
explains the logic behind forming a merry-go-round group. She emphasises the importance of 
choosing people for the group who are easily monitored: 
                                                 
33 ‘Group-oriented behaviour’ can denote a broad range of norm pressures. In this discussion I choose to 
see pressure towards group-oriented behaviour as the expectation to comply with economic obligations. 
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What they consider when they choose people is the frequency of the person in the field. If you 
come frequently there is less chance that you will run away from the contributions.     
Eve states that members of merry-go-rounds are surveyed in the field, in order to ensure that 
they remain faithful to the group. This praxis is further sustained by the fact that many of the 
merry-go-rounds are composed of members with the same occupation in the field. Several 
informants claim that this is done in order to be able to keep an eye on the economic activities 
of the members of the group. Mary outlines an important criterion for asking a wuontich to join 
the merry-go-round: 
An important thing is that you can survey the person’s business and know about her money if 
she is in your merry-go-round. Some merry-go-rounds go according to where you have your 
stall, and some don’t. 
Mary underlines that it is important to have a certain overview of the potential member’s 
economic dispositions. She even indicates that physical proximity in the field helps in 
monitoring the wuontich' economic behaviour. Both Mary and Eve underscore that members of 
the merry-go-rounds are under surveillance in the field. The question is to what extent this 
surveillance imposes a limitation on the wuontich’ business activities. 
 One would imagine that surveillance by other saving group members would implicate a 
limitation on the wuontich’ business activities. There is clearly an element of pressure towards 
group-oriented behaviour in this activity. The question of the exact impact of this praxis on the 
wuontich’ business activities remains unanswered. During interviews very few informants 
complained that other merry-go-round members scrutinised their actions in any way. The most 
obvious sign of imposed limitations is  negative assessment from other wuontich in cases where 
the wuontich chooses to run away from her economic obligations to the saving group. In these 
cases the wuontich' future actions can be limited in the sense that she is excluded from saving 
group participation in the future. The Umbrella Group official and former wuontich Sara 
explains: 
Some people are con-people. They know that they cannot afford to pay for everyone in the 
merry-go-round, so they get an early number and they leave when they have got their own 
share. But you can get a bad reputation and then you will not be allowed in other groups. 
Sara points out that those merry-go-round members who do not comply with the collective 
expectations and run without having paid their share risk being excluded from other groups in the 
future. But exclusion can hardly be perceived as a limitation of the wuontich'  business activities 
as exclusion is based upon a deliberate action taken by the wuontich herself. It is hard to establish 
that the wuontich feel limited in any way by their merry-go-round membership. On the contrary, 
the fact that many of them choose to run away from the groups might indicate that the pressure 
towards compliance with collective norms is low. Once again Sara explains: 
Another thing is that there was more money in the business earlier. Today there are many 
problems and few merry-go-rounds. The reason why many merry-go-rounds fail is that there is 
too little money. Some people also leave when they have got their money. Some people don’t 
care what others say about you when you leave before you have paid your share to the others in 
the group. 
Sara indicates that many wuontich really do not care about the threat of exclusion from the merry-
go-rounds if they run away from your economic obligations. This could be a sign that merry-go-
round membership has low limiting capacity on the Obunga wuontich. Indeed Sara underlines that 
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‘some’ people do not care about the sanctions of others when they run away from the group. This 
might thus not be the case for all the wuontich. The significant leakage of people from these 
groups seems however to be an indication that people do not feel particularly inclined to comply 
with expectations to honour economic obligations. This is an argument that contradicts the initial 
theoretical perspective of agents strategically complying with norms to obtain a resource. A 
logical deduction from the above findings seems to be that the limitation of social capital, 
symbolised in pressure towards compliance with economic obligations, seems not to be very 
prevalent in the case of social capital in the form of merry-go-round membership. 
 One could ponder upon the reasons for this. On the one hand, merry-go-round 
membership seems to constitute important social capital to the wuontich. On the other hand, the 
wuontich do not seem particularly eager to fulfil the obligations that would ensure continuous 
affiliation with the group. The reason for this might be that some of the wuontich have several 
options for income-generating activities. Nathalie, a Community Development Assistant in 
Obunga, underscores this reality: 
People in Obunga are coming and going all the time. There are severe fluctuations in staff. 
Some go back to their homes when the business is bad. 
The lack of limitations in the form of group-oriented behaviour might have its explanation in the 
fact that the wuontich are able to switch between income-generating activities. One might assume 
that dependency on the merry-go-round decreases when one has several income-generating 
activities. The limitation in the form of group-oriented behaviour thus becomes less severe. 
 If this assumption is true there might be reason to believe that a difference between men 
and women exists in this field. Female wuontich might be more dependent on the merry-go-round 
as social capital and thus be more exposed to limitations imposed by the group. The reason for this 
is that many of the women who have come to Obunga have few opportunities to go home to their 
village to engage in agricultural activities, which is an important income-generating activity in this 
area. The reason why many women are restrained from returning to their villages is intimately 
associated with Luo marriage customs34. The District Development Officer Nelly explains that 
many women have lost their possibility to go home to the village: 
Some times the in-laws from the villages can throw them away. The women don’t know their 
legal rights. In some cases there is a big pressure against them.  
Mary sustains this view in her explanation of the situation: 
Many women were chased away so they cannot go back to the village. Many of them are not 
liked by the family of the husband. It is difficult to go back and stay with the parents. Like 
myself, I am a single mother but at my age I am not allowed to go home and stay with my 
parents. I can just go as a visitor. Some of the in-laws snatch land from the women. Others are 
ok and think about the kids. 
If this is the case, one might believe that the women have fewer arenas for income-generating 
activities and are thus more exposed to limitations in the form of group-oriented behaviour. This 
assumption is interesting but difficult to sustain for two reasons. One of them deals with the fact 
that the women actually seem to have alternative arenas for work outside the skeleton business. 
                                                 
34 See chapter three for in-depth information on these mechanisms. 
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The other reason deals with lack of information on the people who choose to dishonour their 
obligations to the saving group. 
  Even Nelly later admitted that the women, be the widowed or single, actually have 
possibilities to go home to their own parents and engage in agricultural activities there. They also 
have the possibility to earn money from Changaa35-brewing, sale of clothes or prostitution: 
Some sell their bodies when business is low. Some like this and some people do not. Some 
look upon their body as a source of income. It is not as much prostitution as earlier, but these 
numbers will increase. Doing petty trade is another source of income to these ladies, they sell 
teaspoons of soap and small quantities of other commodities (…). 
The citation highlights the fact that the women are not solely dependent on the skeleton business 
for income. A logical deduction from this might be that they are less dependent on merry-go-
round membership as social capital. The assumption of a gender difference in the dependence on 
merry-go-membership as social capital, and thus vulnerability to limitations imposed by this 
group, seems to be difficult to sustain. Another reason for this is that there are no specific data 
confirming that men are more inclined to run away from the merry-go-round group than women. 
 The most reasonable deduction from this is that since the Obunga agents seem to have 
several sources of income they are less vulnerable to limitations imposed by the saving group. As 
merry-go-round membership is not necessarily the most important form of social capital for 
people who switch between arenas of work, one can imagine that they feel less prone to be limited 
by social demands for group-oriented behaviour. Social capital, in the form of merry-go-round 
membership, thus seems to have a small limiting capacity on the Obunga wuontich. 
Family bonds were previously mentioned as social bonds that could represent social 
capital to the wuontich in Obunga. Several quotations stated that the jawero tend to give priority to 
family members when the skeletons are distributed. One could on the other hand imagine that 
family bonds represent a limitation on the wuontich’ business activities. Granovetter emphasises 
that family bonds might indeed limit the possessor's scope of action (Granovetter 1995). He points 
out the fact that non-economic loyalties, like family bonds, are not particularly growth-oriented. 
This opens for a view of family bonds as limiting the wuontich’ business prosperity. Whisson 
states that among the Luo, such family bonds have traditionally had a strong limiting capacity on 
business prosperity (Whisson 1988). Betty explains how she reasons when she employs workers: 
It is better with people from the field than family. The family can play around with the 
business. 
Mary puts this in a more emphatic way: 
Many people have employed family members but they went down (…) the family is often after 
your downfall (...) 
Mary and Betty do not give concrete examples of the limiting capacity of family bonds. They 
merely hint that employing family members might be problematic. They provide indications that 
family bonds might indeed impose certain limitation on the wuontich. 
Against the assumption of family bonds as a limiting capacity stands the finding that 
wuontich do not seem to feel obliged to employ family members as workers. As the theoretical 
framework is open for an understanding of the totality of the family network as social capital, it is 
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relevant to also look to the wuontich-worker relation rather than merely to the wuontich-jawero 
relation to find signs of the limiting capacity of family bonds. 
The wuontich Peter states that employing family members as workers might be bad for the 
business, as they do not always perform well: 
The family members don’t work with the same courage so some people don’t want them. 
This sustains the assumption that family bonds might indeed impose a limitation on the wuontich’ 
business prosperity. Family members might work less diligently and expect the same payment. In 
that capacity they might contribute to decreased profits for the wuontich. 
 The latter part of Peter’s citation reveals, however, that the limiting capacity of having 
family members as workers is not as severe as anticipated. He states that since family members do 
not work very hard: “some people don’t want them”. He continues: 
The wuontich can choose anyone, they can go through the family member but usually they 
employ ordinary workers. 
Peter points out that the wuontich do not feel obliged to hire family members as workers. Other 
wuontich and workers in the field sustain this attitude.  Mary says: 
In business there are really no relationships. You don’t need relatives in your business. My 
business is my business. 
By this statement she seems to indicate that the wuontich do not feel particularly inclined to hire 
family members. Due to the fact that employment of family members does not seem to be 
obligatory, family bonds cannot be said to have a limiting capacity on the wuontich’ business 
activities. Of course, family bonds might impose a limitation in other respects, but examples of 
this were not given in the conversations with the informants. 
 This finding contrasts with Granovetter’s earlier presented assumption that family 
bonds might limit the agent’s business strategies. He claims in a study of Indonesia that family 
bonds that can be perceived as an asset can simultaneously limit the individual’s business 
opportunities. Granovetter does not actually use the term social capital, but his findings still 
underline that family bonds in the Obunga study display different qualities than what is often 
expected in the urban informal sector. 
 It has proved difficult to sustain the view that family bonds limit the business prosperity 
of the Obunga wuontich. The wuontich profit from their family relations with the jawero, but 
obviously do not feel obliged to hire family members as workers. If family bonds impose 
limitations on the wuontich, it was not readily apparent through interviews. It must be noted that 
this finding can perhaps partly be explained by methodological weaknesses because I did not 
introduce a division between close and more distant family relations. I thus have to base my 
findings upon the fact that the informants do not perceive family relations (in a broad sense) to 
significantly limit their scope of action in the skeleton industry. That family bonds might have a 
limiting capacity in relation to other social or economic arenas is very possible. 
 This finding leaves certain questions unanswered. Why is it that the Obunga jawero 
choose to give priority to the wuontich with whom they share family bonds, while the wuontich do 
not feel particularly inclined to employ workers they are related to? It is hard to find an answer to 
                                                                                                                                               
35 Local alcoholic brew. 
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this discrepancy in sense of obligation felt at the various levels in the work organisation in 
Obunga. One explanation for this might be that the jawero might give priority to family members 
because he does not face a potential loss by this action. As he would demand the same payment 
from family members as from other agents, he might as well give priority to agents that he is 
related to. A wuontich, on the other hand, might face a potential loss by employing family 
members, as these often are seen to work less diligently than others. The choice to give priority to 
family members might thus be anchored in business concerns. It could be that Obunga agents 
honour family bonds only when they do not risk losing profit from it.  This would explain why the 
jawero seem to honour family bonds to a greater extent than the wuontich.  
  The discussion has shown that it is difficult to establish that merry-go-round membership 
has a limiting capacity in relation to the wuontich. The wuontich seem to be relatively free from 
any pressure arising from group-expectations. One reason for this might be that the dependence on 
the merry-go-round as social capital seems to be limited. Many of the wuontich obviously have 
several arenas for income-generating activities and this enable them to be more instrumental in 
dealing with what obligations to respect. Social capital in the form of merry-go-round membership 
apparently does not have a strong limiting capacity on the Obunga wuontich, and the wuontich' 
participation in several work arenas might be one of the explanations for this. 
Social capital in the form of family bonds does not seem to have a strong limiting impact on 
the wuontich' business prosperity. The limitation imposed on the wuontich by family members 
seems to be in the form of an obligation to hire family members as workers. The empirical 
material, however, sustains that the wuontich feel obliged to hire family members as workers. The 
totality of the findings presented here suggests that social capital in the form of family relations 
does not seem to have a strong limiting capacity in the form of group oriented behaviour in the 
skeleton industry Obunga. The initial assumption that this aspect of social capital would be 
present in Obunga thus needs modification. 
The absence of limitations imposed by social capital might increase the value of this 
resource. As this is a resource that might be used without having to deal with the limiting effect of 
pressure encouraging group-oriented behaviour, one might assume that this increases the value of 
social capital to the wuontich. 
 It has been highlighted that social capital does not have a particularly limiting effect on the 
wuontich. Mariken Vaa presents similar findings in her study of an informal settlement in 
Bamako, Mali. She claims that the urban informal economy allows entrepreneurship and multiple 
employment strategies. In addition, she sees that it seems easier to escape the control of 
neighbours and kin in such settings (1991:142). This corresponds well with the Obunga reality 
where social capital does not seem to have a strong limiting capacity on the wuontich. 
On a more general level, the absence of noticeable limiting capacity of social bonds might 
be perceived as a sign of social disintegration in this environment. Obunga appears to be an 
environment where sociability still counts as a resource, but where the inclination to submit to 
social norms is low. This finding stands in opposition to other studies of the urban informal sector 
that state that social networks that might be seen as a resource simultaneously impose limitations 
on the agent’s scope of action (e.g. Portes 1998:9). The limiting capacity of social bonds might 
exist in Obunga, but it does not seem to be particularly prevalent in the skeleton industry. The 
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reason for this might be, as mentioned earlier, that Obunga is characterised by a large portion of 
immigrants struggling to uphold their livelihood. This feature of society seems to make 
instrumentality among the agents prevail, also in relation to social bonds. The specific social and 
economic realities of Obunga thus help explain why the Obunga agents do not perceive 
themselves to be significantly limited by their family relations and merry-go-round networks.  
AN INSTRUMENTAL, AGENT-ORIENTED VIEW OF SOCIAL CAPITAL? 
The theoretical framework indicated that an instrumental, agent oriented view of social capital 
would be applicable to the Obunga setting. The agent-orientation derives logically from the 
analytical choice to focus upon the study of social capital as a strategic resource to the Obunga 
wuontich. 
 The discussion of the instrumental perspective of social capital opens for deeper 
methodological and theoretical reflections. It has previously been established that instrumentality 
per se is a difficult category to detect. With these methodological limitations in mind, I will 
attempt to establish whether the Obunga agents instrumentally mobilise resources through their 
social contacts. However, the theoretical framework goes further than just stating that resources 
might be deliberately mobilised through existing social contacts. It opens for a view of agents 
deliberately constructing social networks in order to mobilise resources through them. These 
assumptions are theoretically challenging because only a few theorists speak of this specific 
feature of social capital. As a consequence, the theoretical guidelines available in this field are 
very vague. I nevertheless attempt to address this issue by discussing whether the agents merely 
mobilise resources instrumentally through existing contacts or establish social bonds with the 
specific aim of mobilising resources through them. If agents construct such networks strategically, 
can such relations be termed social capital, or do they merely constitute what we would call a 
‘business relationship’?  
 In order to capture the nuances in this field I will treat not only family relations and 
merry-go-round membership as social bonds that might constitute social capital but also other 
forms of groups and networks. The discussion will provide arguments why I perceive also these 
other networks to constitute social capital to the wuontich. 
Do the Obunga wuontich instrumentally mobilise resources, in this case supplies of 
skeletons, through their existing social contacts? Instrumentality denotes a deliberate action taken 
in order convert a social bond into social capital. The underlying assumption indicates that 
priorities given to wuontich, with whom the jawero shares a social bond, are not given without 
some incentive on the benefactor's side. It is a consequence of deliberate actions taken by the 
benefactor of the exchange. 
It is difficult to detect any deliberate steps taken by the wuontich to be given priority 
because they share social bonds with the jawero. There are, however, some hints of instrumental 
mobilisation of resources through social contacts. The wuontich Ann explains what she does in 
order to get skeletons from the jawero: 
If work is little it depends whether you know the jawero or not. If he knows you he will give 
you fish. You have to tell him about your problems and then he will give you sympathy (…) it 
depends on the personal connection with the jawero. 
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Ann indicates that a wuontich might approach the jawero in order to motivate him to give her 
priority when the skeletons are distributed. She also indicates that the wuontich evokes the social 
bonds between them. It seems like the personal approach strategy is conducted between agents 
with previous social affiliation. This indicates an  instrumental mobilisation of social capital. 
 On the question of what ensures a continuous  flow of skeletons, most wuontich say 
‘advance payment’. This issue was discussed earlier this chapter, and it was stated that reliable 
payment for the skeletons was an important aspect of realising the full potential of social capital. 
In Obunga, there are many ways to handle the issue of payment for the skeletons; the most 
favourable solution for the jawero is to get advance payment. Could payment be a way of 
instrumentally mobilising social capital? Mary talks about this: 
If two wuontich are ready to pay the jawero will choose the one who is in the family or in the 
merry-go-round of the jawero. 
Mary touches upon a theme that has been mentioned earlier, namely that social capital can only be 
perceived as a strategic asset when the wuontich has advance payment for the skeletons. This 
corresponds well with other findings in the field. Two prominent attitudes can be detected in the 
interviews. One of them says that personal affiliation between wuontich and jawero is a strategic 
asset when the fish is distributed. The other attitude stresses advance payment as the most 
significant criterion for obtaining supplies. These findings combined with Mary’s statement 
indicate that payment might be used instrumentally by the wuontich in order to mobilise resources 
through their social contacts. Other findings also hint at this praxis. Again Mary explains: 
The best thing you can do for your jawero is to pay him cash. 
She continues: 
 Also relatives have to pay. 
The quotations stress the fact that payment is an important criterion to obtain skeletons, even in 
cases where bonds between jawero and wuontich exist. Eve outlines what happens if a wuontich 
does not respect the norms of payment set by the jawero: 
There might be some conflicts on the distribution of fish. Because if you give your money to 
the jawero and he does not give you fish he can normally keep the money for a week. And 
when your money is with the jawero you will be unable to buy fish for a week. You have to 
reduce your work and maybe start washing skeletons for someone else until you get your 
money. The jawero might refund your money if you make a fuss but if you make a fuss you 
might have ruined your possibilities of getting fish in the future. Many people do not disagree 
with the jawero, because if you do the jawero will not consider you when you have a problem. 
The citation seems to reveal that violation of the norms of payment might lead to decreased access 
to skeletons. Eve also indicates that the wuontich comply with these norms as a means to access 
skeletons. Two deductions can be made from this. First of all payment seems to be a way of 
mobilising resources through social contacts. Secondly, the wuontich’ respect of the rules of 
payment set by the jawero may be an instrumental attitude employed in order to access skeletons. 
 When debating instrumentality, it is also necessary to detect whether the wuontich 
construct new social networks that might later be used as social capital. Previously in this 
discussion, social capital was seen as a feature of pre-existing social networks like the family and 
merry-go-round saving group. I will now bring my understanding of social capital one step further 
as I explore how networks might be established for the sole purpose of accessing skeletons. 
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 Bourdieu states that the concept of social capital embraces agents as strategically 
constructing social networks in order to mobilise resources through them. He says: 
 
The existence of a network of connections is not naturally given (…) the network of 
relationships is the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously 
or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly 
usable in the short term or in the long term (…)(Bourdieu 1986: 249). 
 
Strategically constructed social networks can thus also be perceived as social capital. The question 
is: do the Obunga wuontich construct networks strategically in order to obtain skeletons or other 
resources? 
An example of the instrumental construction of social networks in order to obtain 
skeletons might be the incident of the establishment of the splinter group (the Mgongo Wazi 
Group) in Obunga. The splinter group was initiated by a handful of powerful jawero who wanted 
to escape Umbrella Group sanctions.36 An empirical expression of instrumentality would be if the 
wuontich joined the splinter group with the specific aim of obtaining skeletons through the 
affiliation with the group. As a backdrop to this discussion, it must be said that the splinter group 
demanded overt statements of affiliation from wuontich before they would distribute the skeletons. 
Only wuontich with explicit affiliation would be given skeletons. 
 John explains that affiliation with the Mgongo Wazi Group is a way for the wuontich to 
access supplies: 
The strength of the Mgongo Wazi group is that they own the fish. The members support the 
Mgongo Wazi because of the fish. 
This citation tells us that affiliation with the Mgongo Wazi group is a strategic advantage because 
this network controls a large bulk of the supplies. It also emphasises that the wuontich choose to 
join this group as a means to access the skeletons. The latter part of the citation indicates a certain 
degree of instrumentality among the wuontich. This might imply that the wuontich affiliate with 
this network in order to access fish, and these actions can be viewed as instrumental construction 
of networks as a means to access skeletons. 
On the other hand, Peter explains his motivations for joining the Mgongo Wazi Group: 
I changed groups because it was difficult for me to stay in the Umbrella Group. The Umbrella 
Group though that I was telling secrets to the Mgongo Wazi Group and I was thus suspended 
from the Umbrella Group. 
This quotation reveals that there might be other reasons than access to fish that  motivate the 
wuontich to change groups. As the division between the two groups was deeply rooted in personal 
controversies, there might be an entire spectrum of motivations for joining the Mgongo Wazi 
Group. In many cases the motivation of accessing fish might only be one among many for joining 
the group.  Still, one might assume, and the earlier quotations sustain this, that the prospect of 
accessing fish is the major reason why people join the Mgongo Wazi Group. If so, this indicates 
that people join networks as a result of instrumental considerations. We have thus probably found 
                                                 
36 See chapter three for the full story of the conflict. See also appendix 4. 
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signs of instrumental agents in Obunga using networks as tools to access scarce resources. It is, 
however, important to take into consideration the whole array of motivations that might lie 
underneath the decision to join the Mgongo Wazi group. Social expectations, underlying 
obligations to other members in the group and even sanctions, as in Peter's case, might be 
equivalent motivations to join the splinter group. 
 The conflict between the Umbrella Group and the Mgongo Wazi Group opened in ways 
previously explained for a new situation in the field. For some of the key actors in the conflict it 
became important to establish a large group of people as this would be an asset in the struggle for 
the right to distribute the skeletons. I will argue that several agents instrumentally constructed 
social bonds that could later be used as social capital. At both jawero and wuontich level, latent 
social bonds, like clan affiliation, were evoked deliberately in order to attract members to the two 
groups. The jawero Jason expresses how some of the office bearers in the Umbrella Group used 
rhetoric playing on clan affiliation in order to mobilise supporters during the conflict: 
These are still trying to gain power. They are not members of the Kanya Kuar37 clan but they 
say they are in order to get support. 
Jason explains how clan was used as a tool to mobilise supporters during the conflict between the 
Mgongo Wazi Group and the Umbrella Group. He indicates that a strong instrumentality underlies 
the mobilisation of supporters: 
This ‘clanism’ thing is like a campaign from the Mgongo Wazi Group. They say that some 
people are victims of people from other places. The Mgongo Wazi Group was using that 
language to snatch people from the Umbrella Group. This kind of language was used by the 
officials. 
Jason is talking about how the Mgongo Wazi leaders use clan as a tool to mobilise supporters. As 
he himself belongs to the Umbrella Group, his statement might be severely biased against the 
Mgongo Wazi Group. But interestingly enough, Peter from the Mgongo Wazi Group applies 
almost the same interpretation to the mobilisation strategies used by both groups: 
There is Ugeniaism, Alegoism and Luhyaism38(...) both sides use the same language to gain 
supporters. 
Both Peter and Jason sustain the assumption of instrumental and deliberate construction of social 
capital. They add the perspective of clan as a potential resource in this strategic construction of 
social bonds. Clan is not a common denominator that inevitably binds people together. It is a 
social category, or latent social capital, that might be instrumentally evoked by agents when 
necessary. 
I have tried to argue that there are certain traces of instrumentality in the way social 
relations are established and used in Obunga. But if a social bond is constructed for the sole 
purpose of obtaining a resource, is it then not a pure business relationship rather than a relation 
that might constitute social capital to the wuontich? Very few theorists discuss this aspect of social 
capital in depth, preferring instead to treat existing social bonds through which resources are 
mobilised. I will now try to explain why I choose to see these instrumentally established social 
bonds as social capital rather than mere business relations. 
                                                 
37 Significant clan based in Obunga. 
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 I will argue that group membership is what distinguishes social capital from a one-to-one 
business relationship. Again, Bourdieu helps explain this (1986). His understanding of social 
capital boils down to membership in a group which provides its members with collectively owned 
capital or a ‘credential’ which ensures them access to a resource (1986: 249). He opens, as earlier 
mentioned, for an understanding of these bonds as products of ‘investment strategies’. So, if a 
wuontich joins the Mgongo Wazi Group with the specific aim of accessing skeletons, and does so 
by the virtue of her membership in the group, this would in a Bourdieuan understanding of the 
issue qualify as social capital. It is group membership that distinguishes social capital from a one-
to-one business relationship. The actual exchange might be conducted between two agents, for 
example wuontich and jawero, but the reason for which the wuontich is given access to skeleton is 
the fact that the Mgongo Wazi jawero control the large bulk of skeletons and that they only 
distribute these skeletons to members of this group.  
 The establishment of social capital as originating in group affiliation excludes quite a 
substantial number of relations to be viewed as social capital. As the network represents the basis 
upon which the transaction is conducted, only network-based relations must be viewed as 
potentially constituting social capital to the Obunga wuontich. The empirical examples of 
network-based relations that have been mentioned are merry-go-round membership and family 
bonds. The Obunga agents also mention friendship as a social bond that ensures increased access 
to skeletons, but if these friendship relations do not have their origin in networks, they cannot be 
identified as relations that constitute social capital to the wuontich. For a social bond to be seen as 
social capital it must have its reference to, or root in a larger network that provides access to a 
resource by its virtue of being a network. 
 The discussion asked whether an instrumental, agent oriented view of social capital would 
be applicable to an analysis of Obunga. The debates that followed underlined that the wuontich 
seem to be instrumentally mobilising social capital by directly approaching the jawero to ensure 
that resources flow through the social bonds. In addition, the discussion of the conflict seemed to 
indicate that the agents in Obunga even construct new networks in order to be able to use them as 
social capital. These findings sustain the theoretical assumption of instrumentality as a prevalent 
source of social capital in Obunga. 
 One can probably also assume that the ability to instrumentally construct and use social 
capital increases the value of social capital to the Obunga wuontich. As this is a resource that that 
can be mobilised at the agent’s will, it seems to be readily usable as a strategic asset in this 
environment. 
CONCLUSION 
The discussion in this chapter has provided an understanding of the value of social capital. 
Citations of Obunga informants revealed that social capital is indeed a valuable resource to the 
agents because it facilitates access to skeletons. Family bonds and merry-go-round relations were 
found to be social networks that could be used as social capital and thus facilitate the agent’s 
access to skeletons. Indeed, economic input and seasonal variations were seen to be factors that 
                                                                                                                                               
38 Area-based clans and tribes. 
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affected the value of social capital to the agents. Social capital nevertheless seems to be perceived 
as a valuable resource that might facilitate access to skeletons in Obunga. 
 My theoretical framework also assumed that the social network would have a limiting 
effect on participants in the network. Findings from Obunga indicate that this assumption must be 
moderated. Neither family bonds nor merry-go-round membership were seen to have a 
particularly limiting capacity on the agents. This finding indicates that the value of social capital 
as a resource is high because the use of this resource does not seem to imply any cost to the agents 
in the form of pressure towards group-oriented behaviour. 
 Through the theoretical debate I launched the assumption that an instrumental, agent-
oriented view of social capital would be applicable to the analysis of Obunga. The discussion has 
shown that the agents indeed seem to instrumentally mobilise resources through their social 
bonds. It was also recognised that the agents constructed new social networks in order to later use 
them as social capital. This view of the instrumental wuontich stresses that social capital is not a 
static commodity, but a resource over which the agents enjoy a certain amount of control. This 
probably increases the value of social capital to the wuontich. 
 The discussion revealed, however, that it is important to distinguish between social capital 
and one-to-one business relations. It was stated that in order to view a social bond as social capital, 
this bond has to be rooted in a larger network that provides a ‘credential’ that facilitates 
transactions through the social bond. This finding implies that only social bonds rooted in larger 
networks should in the subsequent discussion be viewed as constituting potential social capital to 
the wuontich. This distinction becomes important as I continue the discussion of social capital in 
Obunga as it sets a standard for what relations should be viewed as constituting social capital to 
the wuontich. 
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6.  THE FLEXIBILITY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
The focus of this chapter is how the Obunga wuontich construct and use social capital, in the form 
of social bonds with the jawero, under dramatic contextual changes. Dramatic contextual changes 
will be perceived as externally imposed shocks that profoundly influence the organisation of the 
skeleton industry. This debate will provide material for a discussion of the flexibility of social 
capital. Flexibility will broadly refer to opportunities for the construction and use of social capital 
under dramatic contextual changes. 
The discussion will show that existing ways of organising interaction are challenged by 
dramatic contextual changes. In the establishment of new interaction and exchange patterns, 
certain features of the social relation become visible. Power relations manifest themselves because 
certain agents take control over distribution after the transition. Likewise, inequalities emerge as 
certain agents loose their ability to fully participate in the new exchange structure. A study of 
these processes can provide new knowledge of the flexibility of social capital in Obunga. One of 
the major findings that will come out of the discussion is that instrumentally constructed and used 
social capital is characterised by instability. The reason for this is that the wuontich, although 
encountering some limitations in their construction and use of social capital, in most cases seem to 
be able to flexibly establish new social bonds and to use old social bonds in new ways. This aspect 
of social capital will become particularly evident through the discussion of how a situation of 
conflict made the wuontich construct new social bonds that might function as social capital. 
I have in this chapter chosen to deal with both the social bonds between wuontich and 
jawero that might be used as social capital, as well as the larger networks that provide the 
‘credential’ that might facilitate transaction through these bonds. Both these aspects will be seen 
as parts of social capital in Obunga. The inclusion of these elements in the discussion is done in 
order to ensure a broad understanding of the construction and use of social capital under dramatic 
contextual changes. In every subchapter I will attempt to specify which part of the social capital 
relation I am discussing, and also outline to what extent I see this as construction of new bonds 
that might constitute social capital or new ways of using already established bonds as social 
capital. Construction and use of social capital will not be distinguished as separate entities in the 
larger discussion of the flexibility of social capital. 
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It has proved challenging to obtain data on how the wuontich construct and use social 
capital under some of the dramatic contextual changes. Certain dramatic contextual changes are 
subtle, albeit dramatic, and therefore not reflected upon by the informants. In addition, the 
statements that are used in this chapter often describe a business relation rather than what I have 
already established as social capital: namely social bonds between wuontich and jawero that are 
rooted in shared group membership, family structures or merry-go rounds. I have attempted to 
deal with these challenges by continuously evaluating whether the statements actually describe 
features of social capital relations. 
Four dramatic contextual changes will constitute strategic entry points into the discussion 
of the flexibility of social capital in Obunga. These four entry points are: EU regulations, seasonal 
variations, declining supplies and conflict. Under each heading, the background for the contextual 
change will be presented, after which the wuontich’ construction and use of social capital in the 
new situation is discussed. I then debate what the wuontich’ construction and use of social capital 
in this situation reveal about the flexibility of social capital. The discussions of seasonal variation 
and declining supplies are in many ways intertwined as they both deal with variations in supplies. 
Comparisons between the wuontich’ use of social capital under these two contextual changes will 
thus be made consecutively.  
EU REGULATIONS 
One dramatic contextual change that profoundly affected the organisation of the skeleton industry 
was the introduction of EU hygiene regulations. I will discuss how the wuontich constructed social 
capital under this dramatic contextual change. I emphasise that this discussion deals with the 
social bond between jawero and wuontich that might be used as social capital, but not the network 
that these bonds emerge from. The discussion will show that there seemed to be gender 
inequalities in the wuontich’ ability to become jawero under dramatic contextual change. This will 
be referred to as limitations to the wuontich’ ability to construct social capital, as she seemed to 
have difficulties taking up the more powerful positions of the social capital relation. The findings 
from the discussion will pave the way for reflections on the flexibility of social capital. I will start 
the discussion by outlining why EU hygiene regulations represent a dramatic contextual change 
for the skeleton industry.     
In early 1999, the European Union launched a ban on import of fish from Lake Victoria. 
The ban was effectuated as a response to the failure of local processing companies to meet the ISO 
9002 requirements. In an attempt to raise the hygienic standard, the processing companies decided 
to reduce the number of people entering their premises. Whereas they earlier distributed skeleton 
to any individual, the processing companies now decided to exclusively distribute Nile perch 
skeletons to a handful of individuals. These individuals, the jawero, came to act as middlemen 
between the factories and the Obunga wuontich.  
The new distribution system, induced by the EU regulations, implied that social capital 
had to be used in new ways in order to obtain skeletons. Mary explains: 
The jawero is connecting the factory and the people. 
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Whereas earlier the wuontich could go to the factory to obtain skeletons, all distribution now had 
to go through the jawero under the new distribution system. Ann says: 
Whether you get fish or not depends on whether you know the jawero or not. 
Not only does the jawero link the factory and the people, but a personal relation to him also seems 
to matter for the acquisition of skeletons. The previous chapter underlined that these personal 
relations could be viewed as social capital, as they were often based in shared group membership 
between jawero and wuontich. It seems as if the wuontich, under the dramatic contextual change, 
used social capital by mobilising skeletons through her shared social bonds with the jawero.  
Findings from Obunga underline that the wuontich encountered a constraint to her 
construction of social capital under the new distribution system. This constraint seemed to have a 
gender dimension. Informants indicate that the female wuontich were limited in their construction 
of social capital under the new distribution system, as they were unable to enter the position of 
jawero. Sara explains how she, because of her sex, was blocked from entering the position of 
jawero: 
I tried to be a jawero but could not handle it because the men would fight me for the fish. I 
tried for one year but had to give up because I could not get hold of fish. Even the workers at 
the factories would discriminate me and tell me to go back home. The men will step on you, 
there is great fight for frames. 
John displays the same attitude from a male point of view: 
There are extremely few female jawero. The men use techniques to control them. There used to 
be female jawero but the men blocked them out of business. The women do not manage to 
raise 100, 000 shilling for deposits and the men don’t allow them to. 
Although Sara and John do not refer to social capital in the form of shared social bonds between 
jawero and wuontich, the citations point to a more general feature of the construction of social 
capital. They indicate that female wuontich, under the dramatic contextual change, were blocked 
from entering what one might call the most powerful position of the social capital relation. These 
wuontich were confined to occupying the position in the exchange relation where they had to 
mobilise skeletons through their social bonds with the jawero. This must be noted as a constraint 
to the female wuontich’ ability to construct social capital under dramatic contextual change.  
These findings indicate that agents might have unequal opportunities to construct social 
capital under dramatic contextual change. I will use theoretical input to discuss how gender 
inequalities might impose limitations on agents. Portes explains how economic actions of diverse 
sorts are embedded in overarching social structures that affect their form and their outcomes 
(1995:6). He draws on Granovetter’s writings when he outlines this theoretical perspective. Portes 
claims that as agents belong to larger social aggregates in which many other agents take part, any 
instrumental action will be guided by expectations from the other agents participating in the 
structure (1995:8). According to this theoretical view, the female wuontich is limited in her 
construction of social capital under the dramatic contextual change, because she complies with 
expectations governing gender behaviour. 
John and Sara’s statements do not, however, indicate that the female wuontich is limited 
in her construction of social capital because she complies with such norms and expectations. On 
the contrary, the female wuontich seems to challenge these norms by attempting to become 
jawero. An earlier quotation from Sara said: “I tried to become a jawero”. This indicates that the 
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limitations imposed on female wuontich in their struggle to become jawero do not take the form of 
compliance with gender discriminating norms. Even though the agents are probably limited in 
some sense by underlying norms guiding gender behaviour, the citations above show that 
complementary explanatory factors must be provided that can explain how the female wuontich 
are limited in their construction of social capital under dramatic contextual change. 
Perspectives from Bourdieu’s writings can help explain why the female wuontich is 
constrained in her construction of social capital under the new distribution system. Bourdieu 
acknowledges that underlying objective structures influence actions, but he simultaneously 
acknowledges that these structures are reshaped and reinforced by individual actions (1984:483). 
He attempts to construct a bridge between subjectivism and objectivism (Ritzer 1992:579). 
Bourdieu opens for a view of the Obunga situation that embraces both underlying gender values 
and the actions of agents reinforcing these values as limiting the female wuontich’ instrumental 
construction of social capital. Let us turn to Sara once again with Bourdieu’s arguments in mind: 
I tried to be a jawero but could not handle it because the men would fight me for the fish. I 
tried for one year but had to give up because I could not get hold of fish. Even the workers at 
the factories would discriminate me and tell me to go back home. The men will step on you, 
there is great fight for frames. 
One could imagine that in a Bourdieuian sense, underlying gender values will open for the 
exclusion of the female wuontich from jawero positions. The reason for this might be that these 
gender values prevent women from entering high-status positions as jawero. These underlying 
structures seem to be reproduced by the instrumental actions of the male jawero that enforce the 
discrimination of women from these positions. In this case the male jawero seem to be reinforcing 
these structures by ‘fighting’ the women. In addition, the workers at the factories engage in 
discriminating behaviour that segments the distribution of power between the sexes.  A full 
understanding of this issue would require meticulous studies of the interaction patterns in Obunga. 
One might merely tentatively conclude that based on the above statement, Bourdieu’s view of 
agents and structures as mutually shaping and reinforcing interaction patterns can to some extent 
explain the gender inequalities in the ability to enter the most powerful position in the social 
capital relation. 
 This discussion carries a message about the flexibility of social capital. Flexibility was 
initially defined as opportunities for construction and use of social capital under dramatic 
contextual change. It has been shown that the female wuontich encounters constraints in her 
construction of social capital under dramatic contextual change. This can be seen as impairing the 
flexibility of social capital. The EU hygiene regulations induced a new distribution system under 
which the female wuontich is unable to enter the most powerful position of the social capital 
relation. This constraint has been shown to emerge from gender values which are enforced by the 
actions of individuals. This finding indicates that the wuontich are not able to freely construct 
social capital under dramatic contextual change. The female wuontich encounter certain 
constraints in their efforts to construct social capital under the new distribution system. 
Underlying gender values must thus be acknowledged as a constraint that might emerge under 
dramatic contextual changes, potentially reducing the flexibility of social capital.  
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SEASONAL VARIATION  
In the preceding chapter I discussed how the wuontich used social capital, in the form of shared 
group membership between jawero and wuontich, to obtain skeletons during periods of stable 
supplies. I will now move on to discuss how the wuontich use social capital during the rainy 
season. This season affects the organisation of the skeleton industry by causing a high flow of 
supplies and terrible conditions for drying and frying the skeletons. The rainy season will thus 
represent a dramatic contextual change in opposition to the more ‘normal’ dry season. A study 
of the wuontich’ use of social capital in the rainy season will provide material for a discussion 
of the flexibility of social capital. 
 I will start by describing the impact of season on the skeleton industry. I then discuss 
how the wuontich use social capital by investing in their social relations with the jawero under 
the dramatic contextual change that the rainy season represents. This is done in order to ensure 
that the social bonds can be used as social capital during the lucrative dry season. This 
discussion will thus deal with the wuontich-jawero relation rather than the social networks that 
these relations are rooted in. The discussion also deals with maintenance of old bonds rather 
than construction of new bonds, and I will thus refer to this as ‘use’ rather than ‘construction’ of 
social capital. Theoretical perspectives will be provided to discuss how long-term planning 
represented by investment in social bonds is possible in a rapidly changing environment like 
Obunga. A central argument will be that it is the cyclic character of seasonal variation that 
makes long-term investment in social bonds possible. I will further discuss how only wuontich 
with certain economic means seem to be able to engage in long-term investment in social 
capital. The discussion of the wuontich’ instrumental use of social capital under dramatic, yet 
cyclic, contextual changes will constitute the basis for a discussion of the flexibility of social 
capital. 
Season greatly affects the output of supplies. The rainy season is characterised by a high 
amount of Nile perch being caught in Lake Victoria and processed by the factories. The outflow 
of skeletons into Obunga is consequently high, but the customers are few and the conditions for 
drying and frying the skeletons are poor. During this period, both jawero and wuontich loose 
money. During the dry season, the situation is reversed. The supplies are scarce, the conditions 
for drying and frying excellent and the customers pay a high price for the skeletons. The few 
wuontich who manage to obtain skeletons during this period have high profit margins. 
 The wuontich does not appear to actively use social capital as a resource during the 
rainy season. Mary explains how the abundant supplies make the wuontich less inclined to use 
her social bonds with the jawero as social capital: 
At times when skeletons are many they [the jawero] send their workers directly to the 
wuontich. So this time it is a loss to the jawero because he has already deposited a lot of 
money. They come and convince the women to take the fish at a lower price. 
Mary’s statement indicates that the low profitability during the rainy season creates a situation 
where the wuontich are not particularly interested in taking supplies. In fact, instead of the 
‘normal’ situation during the dry season where the wuontich approaches the jawero and attempt to 
mobilise resources through social bonds, the jawero has to ‘convince’ the wuontich to take the 
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skeletons. We can thus assume that the wuontich does not actively utilise social bonds as social 
capital to obtain resources during the rainy season. 
Other findings add nuances to this picture. Eve explains how the wuontich relates to social 
capital during the rainy season by investing in her relations with the jawero.  This investment will 
ensure her access to skeletons during the rainy season: 
Those who get fish [during the dry season] are the ones who take fish during the rainy season. 
Then they go with a loss. In the dry season there is gain. If the jawero see that you take in the 
rainy season they give you in the dry season. So if you get fish depends on how you do your 
business. 
Emily makes it clear that this is also the case for the wuontich who share social bonds with the 
jawero and intend to use these bonds as social capital during the dry season:  
The jawero know the people who were there in the rainy season; they give more fish to them 
than to those who ran away. Even for people in the same merry-go-round it is important to stay 
in business during the rainy season in order to get in the dry season. 
The two statements in combination indicate that to be able to use social bonds as social capital in 
the dry season, these bonds have to be maintained during the rainy season. Social bonds with the 
jawero are maintained by buying skeletons from the jawero even though the wuontich face 
potential losses through these actions. The wuontich thus seem to relate to social capital under 
dramatic contextual change by engaging in long-term investment in their social bonds with the 
jawero.  
 One could of course argue that the wuontich’ investment in social bonds during the rainy 
season has more to do with long-term business strategies than with the nature of a social capital 
relation. I do, however, believe that as the Obunga setting is characterised by economic 
marginalisation, access to money is the most important part of the social capital relation. This is 
shown by the fact that even in relations founded in larger social networks, economic maintenance 
of the relation is required for the social bond to constitute social capital in the dry season. 
There are however negative cases that challenge the assumption that the social capital 
relation needs maintenance during the rainy season. Janet’s description of how she conducts her 
business stands in opposition to the above arguments: 
I always go home to the village in the rainy season. There is fish everywhere and you can’t 
even sell it to anyone. I come back to do business during the dry season. 
Although Janet does not mention that she utilises social bonds to access skeletons in the dry 
season, she still indicates on a more general level that maintenance of relations with the jawero is 
not needed to obtain skeletons during the dry season. I will nevertheless argue that as several 
informants emphasise that actions taken during the rainy season matter for the acquisition of 
resources during the dry season, this seems to characterise how the wuontich use social capital 
under the altered conditions for action that the rainy season represents. 
The study of the instrumental use of social capital during the rainy season carries an 
important message about the nature of social capital relations in Obunga. It seems as if the 
investment in social bonds during the rainy season implies that the wuontich’ use of social capital 
must be perceived as part of a long-term planning strategy. This finding implies that the social 
bonds that might constitute social capital in Obunga must be considered as characterised by 
stability and predictability. This finding must be seen as standing in opposition to the theoretical 
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framework that outlined Obunga as an environment characterised by instability and 
unpredictability.  
James Coleman’s theories shed light upon the wuontich’ investment in social capital 
during the dramatic contextual change that the rainy season represents. His theories explain why 
the wuontich is willing to accept losses during the rainy season in order to uphold the relation with 
the jawero during the dry season. He claims that if A does something for B and A trusts B to 
reciprocate in the future this creates a form of ‘credit slip’ held by A to be redeemed by some 
performance by B.  This is a form of social capital he claims, and it can only exist in environments 
characterised by a certain level of trustworthiness (Coleman 1990:306). One might easily claim 
that the wuontich’ acceptance of the skeletons during the rainy season creates a ‘credit slip’ held 
by the wuontich to be redeemed by actions from the jawero during the dry season. This possibility 
to create obligations can be seen as a factor that makes the wuontich’ long-term strategies 
possible. On the other hand, Coleman claims that the creation of obligation will only be possible 
in environments characterised by trust. He specifically mentions urban area markets as settings 
where creation of obligations are difficult to achieve (1990:307). Although Obunga has earlier 
been described as a setting characterised by fragmentation and individualism, the wuontich’ 
creation of obligations with the jawero indicates that there is a level of trust that enables 
reciprocity and the creation of ‘credit slips’.  
The cyclic and reoccurring character of seasonal variation might create the level of trust 
that enables long-term investment in social capital by the wuontich. Obunga is, as I have earlier 
discussed, characterised by unpredictability and rapid alterations. In this environment season can 
be seen as a factor which creates predictable changes in a cyclic manner. This predictability might 
enhance the level of trust in the social capital relations and explain why the wuontich are willing to 
invest money in social capital relations in this otherwise unstable environment. Coleman’s 
theoretical perspectives must thus be coupled with the predictability that cyclic seasonal variations 
create. These factors in combination might explain the wuontich’ willingness and ability to engage 
in long-term planning strategies in relation to social capital relations. Long-term planning and 
investment strategies should thus be perceived as characterising the wuontich’ use of social capital 
under dramatic, but cyclic contextual change. 
Other aspects of the wuontich’ instrumental use of social capital under the dramatic 
contextual change that the rainy season represents can also produce new knowledge about social 
capital relations in Obunga. The investment in social bonds during the rainy seasons was said to 
imply certain costs for the wuontich. Not all wuontich seem to have the economic capital to 
nurture the relationship with the jawero during the rainy season. Toby explains: 
Whether you stay or not depends on your own economy. If you have some additional business 
it is easier to stay in the business throughout the year. 
Additional business activities seem to be required to maintain social bonds with the jawero 
throughout the rainy season. It may seem like a paradox that those with additional income-
generating activities invest economic resources in maintaining a relationship where they are the 
dependent party. Nathalie might have an explanation for this dynamic: 
Skeleton business has got a lot of money. Many people move to Obunga because of this 
business (...) Obunga is known as a good business area because of the fish.  
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This statement indicates that as profit margins are considered good in this business, wuontich 
with additional business choose to invest economic capital in the maintenance of social bonds 
with the jawero. It seems as if only wuontich with certain economic capital are able to invest in 
social capital relations under dramatic contextual changes. 
 It might be worth noting that the demands for economic capital to maintain social 
capital seem to be less severe for family members. Betty explains: 
Those who stay [in business] are the ones who get fish. They get money and they keep the 
business going. Some people are only there in the rainy season but sooner or later they will 
collapse because the business is not good in this season. Those who get fish all the time are the 
girlfriends and family of the jawero. 
Betty suggests that social capital rooted in family bonds might require less investment of 
economic capital to last throughout the seasons. Emily, however, stated earlier that wuontich 
who shared merry-go-round group membership with the jawero had to invest economic capital 
in order for social capital to be valid during the rainy season. One might thus assume that social 
capital rooted in family relations needs a lower input of economic capital to be effective. 
 The discussion of the wuontich’ use of social capital during the dramatic contextual 
change that the rainy season represents, carries a message of the flexibility of social capital. A 
certain flexibility, seen as opportunity for the use of social capital, seems to exist during the 
rainy season. Although the social bonds are not used directly as social capital during this season, 
the wuontich still have the possibility to engage in long-term investment in their social bonds in 
order to constitute social capital in the dry season. It seems that it is the cyclic character of 
seasonal variation that creates a level of predictability that enables this long-term investment in 
social bonds. But as the word investment indicates, the maintenance of social capital requires 
economic capital. The economic demands of investment in social capital should be noted as 
reducing the flexibility of social capital to wuontich with little economic capital. Their inability 
to invest in social bonds during the rainy season makes it difficult for them to use these social 
bonds as social capital during the dry season. Social capital thus seems to be a flexible resource, 
open for investment under dramatic, cyclic, contextual changes, but primarily to wuontich with 
certain economic means. This relation between economic and social capital will be further 
discussed in the next sub-chapter. 
DECLINING SUPPLIES  
Declining supplies represent a dramatic, but more permanent contextual change than seasonal 
variation. Although causing subtle change, this contextual change has severely affected the 
skeleton industry in that many wuontich have been pushed out of business because of insufficient 
supplies. I will focus once again on the wuontich-jawero relation and emphasis is given to the 
instrumental use of social capital under this dramatic contextual change. This discussion will 
provide material for reflections on the flexibility of social capital. 
I will start by establishing why Obunga is experiencing a decline in supplies, before I 
move on to discuss how the wuontich use social capital under this dramatic contextual change. 
The increasing importance of social capital to obtain skeletons in a situation characterised by 
scarcity will constitute an important part of the discussion. Economic capital, as an important 
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prerequisite for the effectiveness of social capital as a resource is also a prominent aspect in this 
debate. As both declining supplies and seasonal change represent variations in supplies, 
comparisons between the wuontich’ use of social capital under these two dramatic contextual 
changes will be made consecutively. This comparison might produce new knowledge on the 
nature of social capital in Obunga. 
Lake Victoria has in recent years experienced a decline in catches. A variety of reasons lie 
behind this development, the most prominent being over-exploitation of the resources in the lake 
(Jansen 1997). This development has led to a situation where the companies are processing fewer 
and smaller-sized Nile perch. As a direct consequence of this, the outflow of skeletons into 
Obunga has been steadily declining during the past years.  
It has proved challenging to obtain information on how the wuontich use social capital to 
obtain resources in a situation characterised by increasing scarcity. The informants often outline 
season as the factor that has most considerable influence on this business. Peter expresses how 
season has a more visible impact on the skeleton industry than declining supplies: 
The business has not really changed. The difference is more about season. 
Peter’s view of season as more decisive for business might have its explanation in the fact that in 
an industry where day-to-day survival is an explicit goal, the long term trends becomes more 
subtle. This is also a methodological issue as data describing long term and slowly changing 
structures are often hard to obtain through retrospective interviews. It should also be noted that 
seasonal variations will exist even in situations characterised by declining supplies. These 
conditions for action might overlap, and this should be noted as part of the backdrop for the 
discussion conducted here. 
An earlier quoted citation from Ann can, however, help explain how the wuontich use 
social capital to obtain skeletons in situations characterised by declining supplies. Her statement 
conveys a general reflection upon how it becomes increasingly important to actively mobilise 
resources through social bonds with the jawero when supplies are scarce: 
If work is little it depends on whether you know the jawero or not. If he knows you he will 
give you fish. You have to tell him about your problems and then he will give you sympathy 
(...) It depends on the personal connection with the jawero.  
The possibility is present that Ann is referring to seasonal variation rather than to the general 
decline in supplies. The core of her statement stands, however, as an example of a more generic 
mechanism; when there is scarcity, it becomes important for the wuontich to approach the jawero 
and evoke the social bonds that exist between them. Ann does not say that these social bonds are 
rooted in shared group membership in merry-go-rounds or family bonds. Betty, on the other hand, 
says that social capital, in the form of shared group membership between wuontich and jawero, 
becomes increasingly important in times of scarcity.  
When there is little fish the jawero look for their friends and family first: many people don’t 
get. 
Betty indicates that social capital becomes an increasingly important asset in times of scarcity. 
This importance is sustained by Ann’s description of how the wuontich approached the jawero 
directly to obtain supplies in a situation characterised by scarcity. 
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  These statements also point to another feature of the wuontich’ use of social capital under 
dramatic contextual change. Apparently, it does not suffice to posses social bonds with the jawero 
to obtain skeletons. In order for these bonds to constitute social capital in situations of scarcity, the 
wuontich has to approach the jawero to evoke the social bonds that exist between them. The 
importance of personal contact as a prerequisite for social capital to be valid in periods of scarcity 
is an important aspect of the wuontich’ use of social capital under dramatic contextual change. 
The acceptance of higher prices for the skeletons appears to be a feature of the 
wuontich’ use of social capital in a situation characterised by scarcity. Ann describes how the 
wuontich gets skeletons when there is little work: 
If there is little work there is disagreement. The people with the money get the fish.  
A major strategy that the wuontich might apply to maintain her social capital under this dramatic 
contextual change thus seems to be accepting to pay a higher price for the skeletons. Although 
Ann does not say whether the people who get the fish are agents with shared social bonds with the 
jawero, she seems to outline a more general feature of the relation. It is therefore reasonable to 
deduce that economic capital is an important requirement to obtain skeletons even in cases where 
social bonds that can be utilised as social capital exist between the wuontich and the jawero. This 
assumption is sustained by the findings in chapter five that outlined prompt payment as a 
prerequisite for social bonds to constitute social capital. This situation has similarities with the 
wuontich’ use of social capital during the rainy season. It was earlier stated that in order to 
maintain social capital during the dry season, the wuontich has to accept a loss during the rainy 
season. In both cases, economic means are required for the wuontich to be able to instrumentally 
utilise social capital under dramatic contextual changes. 
 These findings tell us that economic capital might be required for the utilisation of social 
capital in Obunga, especially in periods of scarcity. As a result, it might be that the wuontich with 
economic capital are able to use social capital as a strategic asset. This dynamic can be 
theoretically described. The relationship between economic capital and social capital is debated by 
Bourdieu (1986). He claims that social capital can be derived from economic capital (1986:252). 
This theoretical assumption seems to recognise that only wuontich with economic capital are able 
to maintain their social capital through shifting conditions for action. Bourdieu continues to say 
that economic capital invested in social capital comes in the form of expenditure of time and 
attention (1986:253). This statement appears not to correspond with the Obunga setting as the 
wuontich seem to invest hard cash rather than time and attention in their social capital relations. 
Recalling that Obunga is a setting characterised by shifting relations and a struggle for economic 
survival, it might be easier to understand why it differs from the French reality described by 
Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s recognition of the interrelationship between economic and social capital still 
has explanatory value in the Obunga setting. During periods of declining supplies and through 
seasonal variations, it seems as though acceptance of higher economic demands is an important 
strategy to adapt social capital to dramatic contextual change. This implies that only wuontich 
with economic means are able to maintain and use their social capital in these changing 
circumstances. 
 With reference to the interrelation between economic and social capital, it is tempting to 
argue against those who claim social capital to be a resource for the very poor who lack other 
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forms of capital. The World Bank, for example, believes that social capital enables the poor to 
initiate small enterprises and increase their income (World Bank homepage 2001). This view of 
social capital can be contrasted with Mary’s statement on what happens to the wuontich with 
few economic means when there is scarcity of resources. She says:  
Many people have been pushed out of this business due to a variety of reasons.  The poor are 
driven out of business. Fish business is very difficult to be with (…) the weak people are 
driven out. Some people are just weak because they can’t organise the money. You need to 
have money to pay the jawero in advance. You have to do your savings. It can of course be 
difficult if you have many children. 
Mary’s statement underlines that social capital does not seem to be a resource for the very poor 
wuontich in Obunga for the sheer reason that they have to pay in advance in order to make 
resources flow through social bonds. These findings stand in opposition to the World Bank’s 
view of social capital as a resource of the poor. 
 The relationship between poverty and social capital stands out as an interesting feature 
of this discussion. Granovetter has attempted to explain the interrelationship between 
reproduction of poverty and social capital. He sees that in some environments social capital 
might have a limiting effect on the agent in the form of excessive claims from other members of 
the social network. These claims reproduce poverty in that they prevent investment and the 
construction of social bonds that transcend the social network that the agents belong to 
(Granovetter 1995:144). Earlier discussions have shown that there is little pressure towards 
group-oriented behaviour in Obunga. Granovetter’s theoretical assumption is thus not 
immediately transferable to the Obunga setting. Social capital in Obunga might rather be seen as 
to some extent reproducing poverty in other ways. As the use of this resource requires economic 
input, it is likely to assume that the very poor are not able to realise the full potential of social 
bonds as social capital under shifting conditions for action. In that way one might say that the 
nature of social capital helps reproduce poverty in Obunga, although in ways other than those 
described by Granovetter. 
 Again, social capital has proven to be a flexible resource in that the wuontich are able 
utilise social capital to obtain skeletons also in a situation characterised by declining supplies. 
At the same time, it should be noted that this flexibility is limited in that an increased effort 
seems to be required for social bonds to constitute social capital. This increased effort is 
expressed by the wuontich’ direct approach to the jawero to evoke the social bonds that exist 
between them. Social capital has proven to be a flexible resource, but not to the wuontich who 
lack economic capital. As dramatic contextual change has caused the prices for skeletons to rise, 
economic capital has become an increasingly important prerequisite for social capital to be 
valid. This excludes the wuontich who lack economic capital from realising the full potential of 
social capital as a resource, and should be noted as a limitation to the flexibility of social capital. 
The discussion has showed that this particular limitation to the flexibility of social capital might 
contribute to reproduce poverty, as the very poor wuontich might encounter restraints to their 
use of social bonds as social capital under dramatic contextual change. 
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CONFLICT 
During the period of fieldwork a conflict evolved in Obunga. Following this conflict, two groups 
rather than individual jawero came to control the distribution of skeletons. This situation had 
consequences for how the wuontich used social capital to obtain resources. The first part of this 
sub-chapter will establish conflict as a dramatic contextual change that affected the organisation of 
the skeleton industry. I then recuperate the events that led to the conflict, before I move on to 
discuss the wuontich’ use of social capital in this situation. This discussion will contribute 
perspective to the debate on the flexibility of social capital under dramatic contextual change. 
 The discussion will focus on the larger network that provides the jawero-wuontich 
relation with the legitimacy that makes these bonds constitute potential social capital to the 
wuontich. I will here discuss the construction of new social bonds that might constitute social 
capital rather than altered use of existing social capital relations. The discussion will reveal that 
old bonds that might constitute social capital seem to be easily replaced39 by new social bonds that 
might fill the same function. This finding provides an important argument in favour of viewing 
instrumentally constructed social bonds as characterised by instability. 
 Treating a micro-level conflict as a contextual change might be perceived as problematic. 
One might argue that as the wuontich themselves are a part of the conflict, this could hardly 
constitute a contextual condition to which they adapt. I will nevertheless argue that as this conflict 
was initiated and nurtured by certain individuals among the jawero and the Umbrella Group, the 
common wuontich had very little influence over the course of action. The conflict will thus be 
seen as a dramatic contextual change to which the wuontich adapted their social capital. 
I will briefly present the events that led to the establishment of two major groups in the 
field. The two opposing parties in the conflict were a group of jawero and the Umbrella Group, 
which is the officially elected work organisation in Obunga. Before the conflict started, the 
Umbrella Group operated as a work organisation that controlled business activities in the skeleton 
industry. The conflict started when two jawero were suspended by the Umbrella Group because 
they attempted to acquire tenure of the land where the skeletons are fried. This provoked a conflict 
as it was seen as a sign that these two jawero wanted to take control of the skeleton industry. In 
order to be able to distribute skeletons to the wuontich, these jawero established their own group, 
called the Mgongo Wazi Group, in opposition to the Umbrella Group. The Umbrella Group now 
came to stand as one of the parties in the conflict rather than as the group who represented all the 
agents in the skeleton industry. The conflict between the groups resulted in physical fighting and 
the imprisonment of several members of both groups40. 
The new situation with two groups dominating the field implied that group membership 
became the new criterion to access skeletons. Both groups had jawero taking skeletons from the 
factory and they insisted on distributing skeletons only to their own supporters. Many wuontich 
seemed to follow the jawero with whom they shared social bonds to the new group. Betty explains 
how the new system of distribution was organised: 
                                                 
39 This is not to say that these bonds are dissolved, but that they might be closely intertwined in new 
forms of social capital or lose their value as bonds that ensure easier access to skeletons. 
40 See appendix 4 for newspaper clipping on this event. 
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The business has changed because there is discrimination in the field. There is a fight between 
the Umbrella Group and the Mgongo Wazi Group. You have to state your affiliation before 
you get fish. 
Even though many of the old bonds between wuontich and jawero seemed to persist, openly 
stated group affiliation became the new, prime criterion to obtain skeletons. Membership in 
these groups can be viewed as social capital as it provides its members with a ‘credential’ that 
facilitates the canalisation of resources through social relations (Bourdieu 1986:249). One might 
thus say that under the new system, group affiliation was a new kind of social bond that could 
be used as social capital. 
Statements from Betty indicate however that it was possible to access supplies without 
participating in a group, after the dramatic contextual change that the conflict represented. She 
explains:  
I do not want to take a stand because I do not want to be on the losing side. If I am lucky I will 
get fish anyway. 
Evidently not all wuontich adapted to the new situation and started utilising social capital, in the 
form of group membership to access resources. This indicates that group membership did not 
seem to be an absolute requirement to obtain fish skeletons. This finding contradicts the above 
presented assumptions. But even though Betty is not member in a group, she still adapted to the 
new realities in the field. Her strategy was to balance between the groups because as she says, 
“she does not want to be on the losing side”. She indicates that this strategy might fail as she 
says: “if I am lucky I will get fish anyway”. It is hard to say why Betty chose to apply this 
strategy to get fish. But even though Betty did not use group affiliation as her primary strategy 
to obtain skeletons, she still adapted to the new bonds that constitute social capital when she 
conducted her business. This indicates that openly stated group membership became an 
important way of instrumentally constructing new social bonds to ensure access to skeletons 
under the dramatic contextual change that the conflict represented. 
The wuontich’ adaptation to the situation where two groups dominated the distribution 
underlines that the wuontich are able to respond to new types of situations and to establish new 
social bonds that might constitute social capital if necessary. John displays this instrumental 
attitude to social capital: 
The strength of the Mgongo Wazi Group is that they own the fish. The members support the 
Mgongo Wazi Group because of the fish. 
 The theoretical framework outlined instrumental agents, constructing and using social bonds 
for their own benefit. Johns statement sustains this view as he explains how wuontich joined the 
groups because this would help them to access skeletons. The ways in which the wuontich 
responded to the new situation and constructed new social bonds that might be used as social 
capital emphasise their use of social bonds as a means to obtain an end.  
This finding brings us closer to very interesting aspects of the social capital literature. In 
most writings, the construction and use of social capital as a resource is commonly associated 
with predictability and stability (e.g. Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993). This view of social capital 
as stable social structures is often explained by an understanding of social capital as rooted in 
and reinforced by social norms. As presented above and in the theoretical framework, 
instrumental action seems to be a more prevalent source of social capital in Obunga than norm 
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compliance. Instrumentality as a source of social capital seems to enhance instability in social 
capital relations, as these relations seem to be consecutively changed in order to facilitate access 
to a resource. This is a very important aspect of instrumentally constructed social capital that 
will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. 
Bourdieu acknowledges that instrumental action might be a source of social capital but 
he fails to describe the potentially unstable nature of these social bonds. He claims that social 
bonds that constitute social capital are enacted and enforced in exchanges (1986:249). Bourdieu 
does not, however, describe that new social bonds that might be used as social capital might 
override old social bonds when it becomes difficult to conduct exchanges through the ‘old’ 
social bonds. By omitting description of this feature of social capital, Bourdieu overlooks the 
potentially unstable nature of social capital. As social capital is commonly assumed to be a 
social feature that enhances economic growth and institutionalisation, the instability of these 
bonds as seen in Obunga has an important message in the social capital debate. 
The wuontich’ instrumental use of social capital under conflict carries a message about 
the flexibility of social capital. Flexibility was initially defined as opportunities to utilise social 
capital under dramatic contextual change, and the wuontich seemed to be able to flexibly use 
newly constructed social bonds as social capital during the conflict. This flexibility has been 
explained by the wuontich’ instrumental attitude to the social capital that they posses. As social 
capital seems to be viewed as tools that might be utilised to obtain skeletons, new social bonds 
that might constitute social capital seem to be easily constructed by the wuontich. This indicates 
a high degree of flexibility in social capital as a resource for the Obunga wuontich. The negative 
side effect of this flexibility is that it might contribute to local-level instability that in the long 
run might jeopardise business prosperity in this area. This aspect will be discussed in depth in 
the concluding chapter. 
CONCLUSION  
Inquiries into how the wuontich construct and use social capital under dramatic contextual change 
have provided new knowledge of the flexibility of social capital in this environment. I will now 
briefly try to recuperate the major findings from the preceding discussion. 
The way in which the wuontich instrumentally construct and use social capital under 
dramatic contextual change indicates the flexible nature of social capital as a resource in this 
environment. The example from the conflict in Obunga showed that when the context is 
dramatically changed, agents are able to instrumentally establish new social bonds that might be 
used as social capital in order to obtain skeletons. This finding indicates the flexible nature of 
social capital, as the wuontich seem to be capable of establishing new bonds that might be used as 
social capital.  
Social capital does not, however, seem to be a flexible resource to all the wuontich in 
Obunga. The discussion revealed that there were gender inequalities in the wuontich’ ability to 
construct social capital under the new distribution system that was introduced as a response to EU 
regulations. The female wuontich were blocked from entering positions as jawero, and were thus 
unable to occupy the most favourable position in the exchange relation. This gender inequality in 
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the ability to construct social capital should be noted as a limitation of the flexibility of social 
capital 
Other findings also suggested that social capital is not an equally flexible resource to all 
the Obunga wuontich. The discussion of the wuontich’ instrumental use of social capital to obtain 
resources in the course of seasonal variations and declining supplies, demonstrated an inequality 
in the ability to use social capital. I showed that in order to instrumentally utilise social capital 
under these conditions for action a certain economic input was required. Wuontich who lack 
additional businesses seem to have difficulties realising the full potential of social capital under 
these dramatic contextual changes. This indicates that social capital should not be perceived as a 
resource equally available to all agents. This can also be viewed as reproducing poverty as the 
very poor might have difficulties obtaining resources through their social bonds due to the high 
demand for economic capital. 
I argue that the flexibility of social capital enhances instability in the social bonds that 
might constitute social capital. As the agents apparently have an instrumental attitude to these 
bonds, they seem to be eager to continuously construct and use social capital that ensures access to 
a resource. Although the discussion showed that maintenance of existing bonds was at times the 
best strategy to access skeletons, it was also shown that the wuontich easily replaced old social 
bonds that had constituted social capital with new bonds that might fill the same function if this 
ensured access to skeletons. My argument is thus that the instrumentality that opens for flexibility 
in social capital simultaneously contributes to instability in social bonds. In other words, social 
bonds are maintained according to their value as social capital that might ensure access to 
skeletons.41 The ability to flexibly adapt social capital to new situations might increase the value 
of these bonds to the individual, but it might also enhance instability at the aggregate level. This 
issue will be explored in depth in the concluding chapter.                                                                                                
                                                 
41 This is not to say that, for example family bonds will be dissolved when they no longer ensure access to 
skeletons.  
73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.  RE-THEORISING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
 
 
The analysis of the Obunga agents’ business strategies has several implications for the social 
capital debate. Three major contributions to this debate generated by the Obunga study will be 
presented here. First of all, I will argue that instrumentally constructed42 social capital seems to 
be a flexible resource that is usable to most agents under dramatic contextual change. I will 
underscore that most theoretical contributions omit this perspective when they discuss social 
capital.  
The second main contribution to the social capital debate is the argument in favour of 
recognising that the flexibility of instrumentally constructed social capital might contribute to 
instability at the community level. I claim that the agents’ instrumental construction and use of 
social bonds might contribute to instability in these bonds, as they seem to be maintained 
according to their ability to facilitate access to skeletons. What is seen as flexibility at the 
individual level might thus contribute to instability at the community level. I will use these 
arguments to challenge the World Bank’s claim that there is a direct interrelationship between 
social capital and level of trust and development in a community. I further argue that the World 
Bank fails to recognise that instrumentally constructed social capital can contribute to distrust at 
the community level, hampering local-level development. The World Bank has been chosen as a 
representative for other development agencies in this debate. The reason for this is that I 
perceive it as an influential producer of ideas in development co-operation. 
 The third main contribution to the social capital debate is the argument in favour of 
recognising that economic capital might be required in order to be able to utilise social capital 
as a resource. I argue that many theorists and development agencies, represented by the World 
Bank, do not acknowledge the interaction between economic and social capital as they tend to 
see social capital as a resource for the very poor. I will challenge this view as I claim that 
findings from Obunga indicate that input of economic capital seems to be an important factor in 
making resources to flow through social bonds. These findings indicate that the poor might have 
difficulties realising the full potential of social capital in this environment. 
                                                 
42 ‘Instrumental construction’ will in this chapter refer both to instrumental construction and to 
instrumental use of social capital.  
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The concluding paragraph will sum up my argument by stating the value of the Obunga 
study for the general debate on social capital. I will argue that this case study, even though 
representing only one particular setting, has relevance for the study of social capital in the urban 
informal setting. The Obunga study shows that in a setting where poverty, migration and high 
HIV prevalence prevail, instrumentally constructed social capital might be the most prominent 
form of social capital. This finding can generate important questions when studying social 
capital in similar socio-economic settings. 
THE FLEXIBILITY OF INSTRUMENTALLY CONSTRUCTED  SOCIAL CAPITAL 
In this chapter I will argue that instrumental action as a source of social capital makes it a very 
valuable resource for the individual agents. The reason for this is that social capital that is 
instrumentally constructed and used seems to be easily adapted to dramatic contextual change. I 
will simultaneously point out that this feature of social capital seems to be omitted in many 
discussions of this topic, because many theorists fail to recognise the inherent qualities of 
instrumentally constructed social capital. 
 The Obunga study found that instrumentally constructed social capital was a flexible 
resource to the individual agent. The agents seemed to be able to use old social bonds in new ways 
and construct new social bonds that might be utilised as social capital under dramatic contextual 
changes. Indeed, it was stated that social capital might not be a resource equally flexible to all, but 
it still seems to be a resource that  in most cases can be flexibly used by the Obunga agents. This is 
an important feature of instrumentally constructed social capital that makes it a valuable resource 
to agents operating in a rapidly changing environment. 
 The potential flexibility of instrumentally constructed social capital is not often discussed 
in social capital literature. I will argue that this is the case because most theorists see 
instrumentally constructed social capital as deeply embedded in social networks that will influence 
the actions of individuals. Portes, for example, acknowledges that instrumental motivation might 
well be a source of social capital, but he simultaneously emphasises that these instrumental agents 
might be limited by the enforceable trust that makes the resources flow through the collective 
structure (1998:9). Portes seems to perceive the social networks that constitute social capital as 
more stable than what they proved to be in Obunga. He thereby does not acknowledge the 
potentially flexible nature of instrumentally constructed social capital that allows the agent to use 
it as a resource under varying contextual conditions. 
 Another theorist who opens up for seeing instrumentality as a source of social capital is 
Bourdieu. While Bourdieu does not recognise the potential flexibility of social capital, his theories 
still seem to open to such a reading (1986). In acknowledging that social capital is the product of 
endless investment strategies that are aimed at reproducing social relationships usable as social 
capital in the long run, he acknowledges the flexible and changeable character of instrumentally 
constructed social capital (1986:249). Bourdieu does not overtly acknowledge the flexible 
character of instrumentally constructed social bonds, but his focus on individuals constantly 
investing in social bonds seems to be tangent to a notion of flexibility. 
 This discussion indicates that the flexible nature of instrumentally constructed social 
capital is not often explicitly discussed in social capital literature. The reason for this might be that 
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the social networks that are seen as constituting social capital are perceived as more static and 
stable than what was found to be the case in Obunga. As the Obunga study found that 
instrumentally constructed and used social capital was a flexible resource to agents operating in 
this sector, it is nevertheless relevant to raise this topic as an issue. The reason for this is that 
similar forms of social capital might exist in similar settings. This makes it relevant to discuss the 
potentially flexible character of instrumentally constructed social capital. 
Although the discussion revealed that social capital is not equally flexible to all Obunga 
agents, the flexible character of this kind of social capital makes it a very valuable resource in a 
rapidly changing environment. This flexibility has a flip side, however. The discussion in the next 
sub chapter will show that instrumentality as a source of social capital opens for the flexible use of 
this resource, but it might also generate instability and distrust in social bonds.  
INSTRUMENTALLY  CONSTRUCTED SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT43  
The preceding chapter underscored that social capital that is instrumentally constructed and used 
might be a flexible resource to the individual agent. In this chapter I will argue that instrumentality 
as a source of social capital simultaneously might contribute to distrust and instability at the 
community level, thus hampering development. My argument is that many theorists and 
development agencies fail to recognise the potentially negative interrelation between the existence 
of instrumentally constructed social capital and the level of development in a community. An 
important part of the argumentation is that the lack of acknowledgement of instrumentally 
constructed social capital has consequences for development assistance. Because this issue is 
rarely raised in theoretical debates, development agencies, here exemplified by the World Bank, 
continue to associate a high level of social capital with a high level of community development. 
 The Obunga study showed that in an environment characterised by poverty, migration 
and high HIV prevalence, instrumentally constructed social capital prevailed. I acknowledge 
that this kind of social capital does not exist in similar settings by necessity. The findings from 
this study make it relevant, however, to problematise whether instrumentally constructed social 
capital might have a negative impact on community development in similar settings. 
Coleman acknowledges that social capital in rare cases might have its source in the 
intentional organisation of networks, but he fails to describe the unstable character of such social 
bonds (1990:313). In his description of this form of social capital, Coleman emphasises that 
intentionally constructed social capital might have several positive side-effects, like the 
establishment of organisational structures that might be available to other agents. (1990:313). In 
this discussion Coleman does not, however, acknowledge that instrumentally constructed social 
capital might have an unstable character, and that such bonds might be easily dissolved. The 
preliminary deduction from this is that even though Coleman acknowledges intentional 
construction of social bonds as a source of social capital, he does not see the qualities of these 
bonds as having a potentially unstable character. His writings do thus not explain the specific 
features of instrumentally constructed social capital in the Obunga setting. 
                                                 
43 ‘Development’ is a broad term. In this dissertation it predominantly refers to establishment of larger 
enterprises and economic activities that require stability and a certain level of trust to prosper.   
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 Woolcock does not see instrumentality as a prominent source of social capital. He states 
that rather than focusing upon rational agents constructing networks, one should concentrate on 
detecting sources of social capital in social patterns of action and in institutional structures at the 
macro level (1998:185). Because he applies a macro focus on social capital, he does not 
problematise instrumentality as a source of social capital.  This implies that he does not focus 
upon the inherent qualities of instrumentally constructed social capital. The potentially unstable 
nature of such bonds is thus not covered in Woolcock’s writings on social capital. 
 The view of social capital as enhancing local development has penetrated policy 
institutions that deal with such issues. Social capital is commonly perceived as the socio-
cultural glue that binds society together and ensures social and economic progress (Mohan & 
Stokke 2000:225). An example is the World Bank's attitude towards social capital as a value 
that enhances development (World Bank 1998). The World Bank states that social capital 
makes transactions more efficient by increasing trust between the involved parties. Social 
capital, the World Bank claims, can enhance development by reducing opportunistic behaviour 
(World Bank 2001). Social capital is thus positively associated with community development. 
As the World Bank traditionally produces ideas that are widely accepted by other development 
agencies, this positive view of social capital as enhancing development is probably widespread 
among other development agencies as well. 
 I will argue that the issue of instrumental construction of social capital is not thoroughly 
discussed by central development theorists. This has consequences for a common perception, 
among for example policy makers, of the relationship between social capital and development. I 
claim that the Obunga case displays features of social capital that have consequences for any 
assumptions of social capital as enhancing development. The discussion has shown that social 
capital in Obunga is instrumentally constructed and used as a part of the wuontich’ business 
strategies. I have found that these bonds are rooted in the individual agent’s wish to access a 
scarce resource. The deduction from this is that such instrumentally constructed bonds, rather than 
being a socio-cultural glue, can be viewed as unstable and easily dissolved according the agent's 
preferences. A reasonable deduction from this is that instrumentally constructed social capital 
might have an unstable character that hampers, rather than enhances local development. 
 Espinoza is one theorist who actually acknowledges the instability of instrumentally 
constructed social capital (1999). In a study of poor people in Santiago, Chile, he reports that 
scarce resources are most likely to be obtained by means of weak and asymmetric ties (1999:163). 
The Obunga study has shown that the social ties between jawero and wuontich are indeed 
asymmetric and weak. The wuontich makes continuous efforts to use the social bonds with the 
jawero as social capital, but the empirical data showed that these bonds are rapidly changed and 
easily dissolved.  Espinoza is thus one of the few theorists who acknowledge the weakness of such 
instrumentally constructed social capital. One can only assume that the inherent weakness of these 
ties contributes to an instability that does not favour local development. This aspect of 
instrumentally constructed social capital is, however, rarely reflected in development policies (e.g. 
World Bank 1998). 
Granovetter provides another example of the implications unstable social networks might 
have for local development (Granovetter 1995). In Estancia, the Philippines, small-scale 
entrepreneurs are said to be primarily concerned with their own welfare and short-term benefit. 
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The expectations that people work only for their own benefit is so powerful that even partnerships 
between kinsmen only last for a short period of time (Granovetter 1995:133). This case has clear 
parallels to the strategic use of social bonds in Obunga. It has been said that a situation 
characterised by high degree of instrumentality disfavours an environment of lasting economic 
activities (Granovetter 1995:133). As the existence of social capital is commonly associated with 
increased economic prosperity, the findings from Obunga and Estancia underline that the 
existence of social capital does not necessarily equal development. It seems as if in cases where 
strong instrumental motivations underlie the mobilisation of resources through social networks, 
the level of trust is low and the basis for the establishment of larger economic enterprises is 
consequently weak.  
Two conclusions might be drawn from this. First of all, although some theorists 
acknowledge the unstable nature of instrumentally constructed social capital, this issue does not 
seem to be fully acknowledged in social capital writings. The consequence of this is that central 
theorists do not fully capture the implications of instrumentally constructed social capital for 
social stability and thus development. 
My second conclusion from this discussion is the lack of acknowledgement of 
instrumentally constructed social capital that is reflected in development policies might contribute 
to wrong assumptions of the interrelation between social capital and development. Because social 
capital is often associated with increased trust and stability in academic writings on this issue, this 
lack of acknowledgement is displayed even in prominent development agencies. I claim that 
agencies that view a high level of social capital as equal to economic development risk omitting 
the essential insight that instrumentally constructed social capital might be unstable and valued 
according to its ability to facilitate access to resources. It might thus be relevant for development 
agencies to ask whether social bonds that are instrumentally constructed and used, might 
contribute to local-level instability and distrust rather than to local development. 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL  
I argue that it is important to acknowledge the interrelation between economic and social capital. 
My argumentation is based upon findings from Obunga that indicate that economic capital might 
be necessary to realise the potential of social capital. The Obunga study makes it relevant to 
discuss this topic as it provides knowledge about what might be important qualities of 
instrumentally constructed social capital in similar settings. I will attempt to demonstrate that the 
interrelation between economic and social capital is not discussed thoroughly enough in central 
social capital contributions. My central argument is that the lack of discussion regarding this topic 
might lead to premature presuppositions that social capital is a form of capital that does not 
require any economic input to be valid. 
Few theorists explicitly acknowledge the interrelation between economic and social 
capital. Putnam even claims that the stock of social capital tends to be self-reinforcing and 
cumulative (1993). In this statement he does not include the perspective that economic capital 
might be required in order to make resources flow through the social bonds that constitute 
potential social capital. 
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Bourdieu acknowledges that social capital is a product of investment strategies, 
individual or collective, aimed at reproducing social relationships (1986:249). He continues by 
stating that such work demands expenditures of time, energy and even economic capital 
(1986:250). In this he acknowledges that economic input might be needed to realise the 
potential of social capital. One very important aspect of his writings, however, states that agents 
might have differential access to the construction and maintenance of social capital depending 
on their class background and economic position (1994). In this argument he makes the 
important distinction that social capital is not a potential resource to all agents regardless of 
their economic situation. This corresponds with the Obunga setting where economic capital was 
required in order to mobilise resources through social bonds. The consequence of this finding is 
that the form of social capital found in Obunga might not be a resource that can be easily used 
by the economically deprived. 
Coleman acknowledges that agents might have to invest economically in their social 
bonds in order to realise the full potential of social capital. He states that by contributing to a 
network, one agent might create an obligation of repayment on the part of the agent that he 
contributes to (1990:306). But Coleman does not seem to acknowledge that economic output is 
required to mobilise resources through social bonds. He sees it rather as a part of creating 
obligations between agents and increasing the level of trustworthiness (1990:306). His view of 
economic input into a social relation is thus more a form of creating an obligation than directly 
mobilising a resource through the social bond. Coleman does thus not discuss how various agents 
might have different possibilities to construct and maintain social capital depending on their 
economic status. 
Portes and Sensenbrenner do not explicitly address the issue of economic investment as a 
requirement for social capital to be valid, but they still provide an empirical example that 
illustrates this issue. They present the Dominican entrepreneur Nicolas who enjoys a good 
reputation that enables him to collect large sums for investment in other businesses. These 
investments seem to allow him to take up new loans (1993:1334). Although not stated explicitly, it 
seems that all the money going out from Nicolas’ business ensures his access to new economic 
means. This could be seen as an example of the fact that mobilisation of economic resources 
through social contacts might require some kind of economic investment. Although not stated 
explicitly, Portes and Sensenbrenner seem to acknowledge that input of economic capital might be 
required to realise the full potential of social capital.  
The above-presented arguments emphasise that the issue of economic capital as an 
important element in initiating flow of resources through social bonds is only moderately debated 
in social capital literature. Although the possible interrelation between social and economic capital 
is mentioned by several theorists, these theorists do not emphasise that direct economic input 
might be required to realise the full potential of social capital. One reason why this topic is not 
much debated might be that social capital in debates on economic organisation is treated as having 
different qualities than economic capital. It is often presented as the x-factor that gives an added 
dimension to debates on the economy. I nevertheless claim that the interaction between different 
forms of capital should be explicitly acknowledged. The Obunga study has illustrated that the 
possession of social capital does not guarantee access to a resource. Certain economic resources 
must flow through the social bonds in order for these bonds to realise their full potential as social 
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capital. This has implications for how social capital should be perceived. If economic means are 
required for social capital to be valid, one can assume that the very poor might have difficulties 
realising the full potential of this resource. As economic capital was shown to make resources to 
flow though social bonds, this might also be the case in other settings where instrumentally 
constructed and used social capital prevails. Instead of viewing social capital as a potential 
resource to deprived agents who do not possess economic capital, one must recognise the relation 
between economic and social capital in discussions of the urban informal sector. 
CONCLUSION 
The continuos dialogue with other theoretical contributions, in combination with strategies for 
challenging my own findings, has enabled me to relate the findings from the Obunga case study to 
the larger debate on social capital (see Yin 1989:409). The Obunga study showed that in an urban 
informal setting characterised by inflow of migrants, poverty and high HIV prevalence, the 
instrumental construction and use of social capital prevail. This finding makes it relevant to ask if 
social capital that is instrumentally constructed and used can also be found in similar settings. 
But the discussion has brought us further than just to stating that instrumentality is the 
prevailing source of social capital in this environment. I have shown that social capital that is 
instrumentally constructed and used might have qualities that are not often debated by theorists 
and development agencies who are preoccupied with this issue. The discussion detailed how 
instrumentally constructed and used social capital might contain a flexibility that makes it a 
valuable resource to the agents in this setting. It was further stated that this flexibility might cause 
instability at the community level. The reason for this is that the agents are able to instrumentally 
use their social bonds and adapt them to changing contextual conditions. This might in turn 
contribute to an instability in these bonds that might cause distrust and hamper local level 
development. In addition, arguments have been presented in favour of seeing the intimate 
relationship between social capital and economic capital, as certain economic resources might be 
needed in order to mobilise resources through social bonds. This might imply that economically 
deprived agents might have difficulties realising the full potential of social capital. 
All these findings generated by the discussion on social capital in Obunga can be seen 
as valuable contributions to the understanding of how social bonds might be used as a resource 
by agents operating in the urban informal economy. The study makes it relevant to ask whether 
instrumentality might be a prevalent source of social capital in similar settings. In addition, the 
Obunga study underscores the importance of recognising the specific inherent qualities of social 
capital that is instrumentally constructed and used. 
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APPENDIX  1.  LIST OF TERMS 
 
 
 
 
 
Changaa : Local alcholic brew 
Djiko  : Frying pan. Used for the processing of Nile perch skeletons 
Homestead : Traditional family home 
Jawero  : Middleman, taking skeletons from the processing plants to Obunga 
Kanya Kuar : Significant clan based in Obunga 
Oluwo Reru : Term used about migrants coming to Obunga, means: ‘those who 
   came along the railway’ 
Teko  : Descision-making power 
Wuontich : Owner of micro-enterprise. Employs workers to wash, dry and fry 
   Nile perch skeletons
  
                                                                              APPENDIX 2.  LIST OF INFORMANTS44 
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Ann Wuontich Not stated Married, Six children in Obunga. Shared 
economic responsibility for the household. No 
additional income-generating activity. 
  x x 
Betty  Wuontich Balancing 
between groups 
Both husband and child dead from AIDS. 
Economic responsibility for herself only. 
  x x 
Emily Wuontich Not stated Has bought land in Obunga. Widow. Seven 
adult children. No additional income-
generating activity. 
  x x 
Eve Wuontich/worker Not stated Married in Obunga. Has three children. No 
additional income-generating activity. 
  x x 
Fiona Interpreter None Not employed in Obunga. One child. Income 
from sale of second-hand clothes. 
 x  x 
Frank Jawero/ Group 
official 
Mgongo Wazi 
Group 
Has good income from his business as jawero. 
Economic responsibility for his household. 
  x x 
Janet  Wuontich Not stated No relatives in Obunga only a few friends. No 
additional income- generating activity. 
  x x 
                                                 
44 All the informants have been given fictitious names 
45 In cases where more that one interview has been conducted, these circumstances describe the impression of all the interviews seen as a totality. 
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Jason  wuontich/jawero Umbrella Group Married, two children. Wife seriously ill.  
Rents a house in Obunga. No additional 
Income-generating activities. 
 x x  
John  wuontich/ Group 
official 
Umbrella Group Married, three children. Has a house and  
Land in the area. Other income-generating  
activities not stated. 
 x x x 
Mary  Former wuontich None Single mother, economic responsibility for 
two children. Works as secretary. 
x x x x 
Nathalie  Community 
Development 
assistant 
None No data on family relations.  Paid by the 
government for her work as community 
development assistant in Obunga 
 x x x 
Nelly  District social 
development officer 
None No data on family relations. Has high ranked 
job in the government system.  
 x x x 
Peter  wuontich/ Jawero Mgongo Wazi 
Group 
Family from Obunga. Owns land there. 
Married, two children. Various other income-
generating activities. 
 x x x 
Sara  Former 
wuontich/Umbrella 
Group official 
Umbrella Group Married. Six live children. Economic 
responsibility for her household. Owns land 
and has got a house in Obunga. Other income 
generating activities are poultry and 
midwifery. 
 x x  
Toby  Worker Umbrella Group Is old and sole provider for his four children. 
No additional income-generating activities. 
 x x  
  
 
APPENDIX 3.  INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
 
Personal data 
1) Where do you come from? 
2) Have you got land? Where? 
3) Why did you move to Obunga? 
4) Are you married? 
5) Have you got any children? How many? 
6) How many people depend on your salary? 
7) Have you got anyone who helps you with money for your household? Who? 
 
Work structure 
8) How long have you been working here in Obunga? 
9) Tell me about how you started working in Obunga? 
10)Tell me about the work you do. 
 
Wuontich: 
11)How did you start to be a wuontich? 
12)How many people do you employ? 
13)Tell me about the different kind of work that they do. 
14)How do you get people to work for you?  
15)Do you have any kind of contract with your workers? Tell me about this contract. 
16)Do you have the same workers all the time? Why/why not. 
17)How do you get fish? 
18)What decides if a wuontich gets fish or not 
19)Where do you have your djiko? 
20)Does it matter where in the field the wuontich has her djiko? Why? 
If yes 
21)-How does one get to have the djiko in a good place? 
 
If IP is a woman. 
22)Do you have men working for you? 
23)Tell me about how it is to be wuontich over male workers? 
 
Worker: 
24)Tell me about the work that you do. 
25)How did you start working with your wuontich? 
26)Do you work for different wuontich? Why? How do you change between wuontich? 
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All: 
27)What do you think about work these days? 
28)Why do you think it is that way? 
29)How has the business changed the past two years? 
30)When there is little work-how do you share the work between you? 
31)Are there any disagreements on this? If yes, what do these consist of? 
32)How are these disagreements solved? 
33)What is the main difference between those who manage to stay in business all the time and 
those who don’t? 
34)Have you ever had to leave this business? Why? 
35)Does it happen that you disagree upon how the work is done here? What do you do then? 
36)Is there something you would like to change about your work? What can you do about it? 
 
Umbrella group 
37)Tell me about the work of the Umbrella Group? 
38)Does it happen that you disagree with the Umbrella Group, What do you do then? 
 
Diversification/vulnerability 
39)From what sources do you get money for your everyday life. 
40)Do you work with skeletons every day? 
If no  
41)-How do you get money on days you do not work? 
42)Have you got any additional business? Tell me more about this. 
 
Social capital and resources 
43)Are you member of any group here in Obunga?  
-What does the group do? 
44)Who are the members of this group (Neighbours, family, «colleges»)? 
45)Are you a member of other groups? Tell me more about these 
46)What do you do to become a member of such a group? 
47)Are anyone excluded from these groups? Why? 
48)Do you help each other here at the marketplace in Obunga? In what way? 
49)Who helps you when you are ill/got problems 
50)Who do you help when they are ill/got problems? 
51)Are all the people here in Obunga helped in the same way? Explain? 
52)If someone does something that the others dislike, what happens then? 
53)Are there people here in the marketplace you tend to be with? Why? 
 
Men and Women 
54)What do you think is the main difference between women and men here in Obunga?Explain. 
55)Do you think it is easiest for a man or for a woman to earn good money here in Obunga? 
Explain. 
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APPENDIX  4.   NEWSPAPER CLIPPING ON CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
(Source Daily Nation 8/12-99) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 5.  WORK ORGANISATION   
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